Day: October 9, 2024

Reform of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector has been at the top of President Muhammadu Buhari’s agenda since assuming office in May 2015.

Despite being drafted in 2007, the 223-page Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) has failed to become law, consequently creating uncertainty in the sector.  Since its inception, the PIB has been dogged by lack of political consensus and disagreements between the government and global oil majors over its key terms.  The new head of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Emmanuel Kachikwu, has been quoted as saying: “the average source of volumes in investments that we are losing on an annual basis because of the lack of PIB is in excess of $15 billion”.

The PIB has now been split into a series of bills that unbundle the controversial fiscal provisions from the non-fiscal components, which the government hope will ease its passage through parliament.  The first of which is the 45-page Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutional Framework Bill (PINGIF).

If the PINGIF is passed, Buhari, the former military ruler who served as Chairman of the state oil giant NNPC in the 1970’s, will oversee the break-up of the NNPC and transfer of its responsibilities to successor entities.  Under the PINGIF, the NNPC will be replaced by two new entities (as opposed to the numerous companies previously proposed in the PIB):

1. a National Petroleum Company (NOC) will be created to operate as a fully commercial entity which will be partly privatised, with at least 30% share capital to be divested to the public in a ‘transparent manner’ within six years of its incorporation; and
2. a Nigerian Petroleum Assets Management Company (NPAM) will be created to own and manage petroleum assets on behalf of the government.

The PINGIF also legislates for the creation of a new industry regulatory body called the Nigeria Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NPRC).  The NPRC would oversee oil licencing rounds as well as the renewal and cancellation of licences.  The powers of the NPRC are wide and include the power to require licensees and permit holders to publish particular information relating to petroleum operations where it considers it to be in the public interest and, through the NPRC Special Investigation Unit, the power to arrest without warrant any person who is found committing an offence under the PINGIF. However, any decisions made by the NPRC must be in writing, contain the basis for the decision and be accessible to the public; which will assist with accountability.  Compared with previous PIB drafts, the PINGIF removes ministerial powers on board appointments which will now be made by the Nigerian president and confirmed by the senate.

Moody’s is optimistic about the future of Nigeria’s economy, stating in the 2015 Annual Report on Nigeria that: “…the successful presidential elections have caused a structural shift that opens up the possibility of gradual improvement concerning institutional strength over the medium term especially concerning rule of law, control of corruption and government effectiveness”.

The PINGIF is the first step on a long road to reforming, and restoring investor confidence in, the Nigerian oil and gas sector.  The slump in oil prices, weakening of the Naira and the depletion of Nigeria’s foreign reserves, caused by Nigeria’s continued dependence on oil for more than 90 per cent of government revenues, has increased the pressure on the government to remove the uncertainties caused by the delays in passing the PIB. Uncertainty remains around taxation and fiscal reform which has not been addressed in the current draft of the PINGIF.  However, this is expected to be addressed in the next piece of draft legislation.

While there are concerns that the draft legislation does not go far enough, the hope is that the PINGIF is a step in the right direction towards greater certainty, transparency and accountability and will unlock much needed further investment into the sector.  Time will tell how industry stakeholders will react to its contents and how quickly it will be adopted into law. For further insight into M&A and financing transactions in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector see: http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2016/january/19/a-legal-overview-of-ma-and-financing-transactions-in-nigerias-oil-and-gas-sector

If you would like to discuss any of the issues raised above, please do not hesitate to get in touch with the authors or any of your other regular contacts in the Dentons oil and gas team.

Leslie Benedict: “Money isn’t everything, Jett”
Jett Rink: “Not when you’ve got it.”
Giant (1956)

And when you don’t got it, as independent oil guy Jett Rink knew, it is everything. The world may run on oil, but the oil industry runs on capital, and for some US shale producers that capital appears to be drying up. After flowing downhill throughout the second half of last year, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil (as of the date this article is being written) is currently at about US$30. Natural gas has faced a similar decline. Might the worst be over? Not yet. Credit Suisse believes that between 1864 and 2008, the four oil bear markets lasted on average two decades and the shortest 11 years. Expect more pain ahead for many exploration and production (E&P) companies who focus on shale oil, deep water oil, or oil sands (collectively, “unconventional oil”) with additional ramifications in the oil field services sector and other related industry segments.  If commodity prices settle at or near today’s prices, many E&P unconventional oil companies may face a liquidly crises while others will require either in-court or out-of-court restructurings. To date, 48 North American E&P companies have filed for bankruptcy. Six E&P companies have filed bankruptcy so far this year. Oil has had its weakest start in history and has negated five year gains.

The current downturn is a reminder that oil and gas exploration and production has always been a cyclical business. Memories of the last downturn in the sector may have faded but investors should keep in mind some of the unique industry and legal issues involved in oil and gas finance.

Weak global demand and the quest for yield

The immediate cause of the present oil price collapse is found in increasing production and weak demand for all commodities and loans since 2008 despite the herculean efforts of central banks to restart global demand via ultra loose monetary policy.  Since the Financial Crisis of 2008, the US Federal Reserve and central banks across the world have increased debt, artificially kept interest rates low and devalued their currencies.

Oil prices rose with a weak US dollar and interest rates near zero in 2009. As prices passed US$80 per barrel in late 2009, unconventional oil production began in earnest. Low-interest rates forced investors to look for yields better than they could find in the US Treasury bonds or conventional savings instruments. Money flowed to E&P companies through high-yield corporate bonds, loans, joint ventures and share offerings.

The extended period of ultra-loose monetary policy, including both exceptionally low interest rates and huge expansions in the balance sheets of central banks helped produce the highest sustained oil prices in history. They also led to investments that are not particularly productive but promise higher yields that can be found otherwise in a zero-interest rate world.

A US-led supply surge from high-cost unconventional fields such as the Bakken, Eagle Ford and the Permian Basin outstripped demand last year and sent oil prices spiraling downwards. The rout deepened in November 2014 after OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, its largest producer, refused to cut production. Other sizeable producers, like Russia, are hard pressed economically and need to keep producing for current cash income. And this is before the impact of Iranian oil coming back into the market.

The key to recovery is increased demand. With demand from China dramatically down and the potential for recession in many other sizeable energy consuming markets, the short-term scenario for demand does not look promising.

Continuing technical innovation which increases production from existing fields and new areas can also be a factor going forward, as it has been over the past decade or so. This can further increase supply from one or more regions of the world, often in dramatic fashion and/or at lower cost than some current production techniques.

E&P restructuring drivers

Since the 1970s, oil companies have put up their own reserves as collateral for loans as a way to secure improved lending conditions. E&P companies rely on reserve-based lending (RBL) to fund operations.  In return, banks demand to revalue those reserves every six months, in April and October —a process called “redetermination”.  Under RBL facilities, banks agree to lend up to limits set by the value of the borrower’s proved oil and gas reserves. They then adjust those limits periodically to maintain adequate loan-to-value and cash flow coverage ratios.

During the previous round of redeterminations last autumn, banks cut limits for most customers between 10 and 20 per cent. With oil still languishing at about US$30 a barrel, analysts say that the next round could be just as severe.  As reported recently in the Financial Times, John Shrewsberry, chief financial officer of Wells Fargo, one of the most active lenders in US energy, told an industry conference in Miami that borrowing availability would be about “10 or 20 per cent down” again in the spring. Banks have also been warned by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the federal regulator, to watch out for the risk involved in lending to oil and gas companies, prompting fears that loans could be withdrawn from businesses that would be financially viable if they were given a little more time.

In times of steep declines in commodity prices, most E&P companies will find the availability for additional borrowings under an RBL facility reduced, in some instances to a level below the aggregate principal amount of loans outstanding, resulting in a borrowing base deficiency. Once a borrowing base deficiency has occurred, most RBL facilities will provide the borrower the option to add additional collateral with a value equal to at least the deficiency amount or to pay down the outstanding loans in an aggregate amount equal to the deficiency in a single payment or in equal installments of three to six monthly payments. In a typical RBL financing, substantially all of the collateral has already been pledged to the lenders as collateral, which leaves the borrower only the option of paying down the debt. Choosing to repay the deficiency amount in installments gives the borrower a short window of time to raise capital, including by selling properties or securing additional credit through junior lien or subordinated debt, in order to avoid an event of default under its RBL facility.

Financing alternatives

The cliché about the hydrocarbon business is that the cure for low prices is low prices, meaning that excess production should lead to a mass wave of insolvencies, cutbacks in activity and eventual price recovery for the rational, hardy survivors. But to date, that does not seem to be happening. Relatively strong debt and equity markets (aided by private equity and hedge funds) have allowed many energy companies to access the financing needed to fight another day.

At the corporate level, there are 2nd lien debt (bond or loans) “replacement” revolvers, DIP financings and equity investments. According to Bloomberg, oil companies have sold US$61.5 billion in stocks and bonds since January 2015 as oil prices have tumbled. Approximately half the money has been used to pay down or re-structure debt. According to Bloomberg, drillers in the Permian Basin, the biggest US shale field, have raised at least US$2 billion from share sales over the past eight weeks. And more issuances are on the way as producers try to avoid piling on additional debt. Pioneer Natural Resources Co.’s 12 million-share issuance on Jan. 5 was followed a week later by Diamondback Energy Inc.’s announcement of a four million-share sale. Private equity firm Kayne Anderson Capital Advisors LP is investing in a startup called Invictus Energy LLC with $150 million to drill the Permian and the Eagle Ford Shale.

At the asset level, there are many creative ways to invest in E&P companies, including, production payments, net profit interest, overriding royalty interest and out right purchase of a stake in the working interest. Whether acquired as part of a recent restructuring initiative or historical purchase, investors who own such carved out royalty interests need to take inventory of counterparty risk and how these positions will be treated in a bankruptcy, including the potential risks of contract recharacterization or rejection and clawbacks of payment already received. For instance, when these types of interests are structured correctly, the party advancing the money is treated as a purchaser of the future production. If the borrower fails, the oil and gas subject to the production payment belongs solely to the investor and cannot be borrowed against or sold by the debtor. Other creditors of the borrower have enormous incentive to attack the transaction and have it characterized as a financing rather than a sale of assets. If an attack is successful, an investor may find themselves a creditor potentially holding a large unsecured claim against a debtor as opposed to holding what they thought was a separate property. That claim will be subject to treatment in a plan of reorganization.

Oil and gas restructuring considerations

E&P companies facing excess leverage or insufficient cash flow may pursue restructuring strategies out-of-court and, if necessary, reorganization in court by filing for bankruptcy, most often under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Bankruptcy Code). The typical parties in an energy restructuring or reorganization include the company as debtor, management, secured lenders, bondholders, potential asset purchasers, trade vendors, service vendors, oil and gas lessors, contract counterparties under joint operating agreements, derivatives counterparties, co-working interest owners, farmors, farmees, production payment counterparties, first purchasers and equity holders. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code provides standing under appropriate circumstances for statutory committees of creditors and equity holders, and potentially for appointment of a bankruptcy trustee or examiner.

E&P cases also present some unique legal issues compared to most Chapter 11 cases, including (i) whether the personal property or real property rules apply (which provide for different rights and time periods), (ii) how special state law rights and priorities such as liens and royalties are treated vis-à-vis secured and other creditors, (iii) whether certain production payments are true sales or disguised financings (as highlighted above) and (iv) whether environmental and clean up obligations can be discharged in the bankruptcy and how such claims are classified and treated.

It is important to note that bankruptcy is a tool and not a strategic plan by itself. Among the tools bankruptcy provides are: (i) a breathing space from creditor payment demands and remedies, (ii) the ability to borrow funds or use cash collateral (e.g. cash on hand and incoming receivables and payments) on a post-petition basis to fund its business, (iii) the ability to sell assets to fund operations often on a free and clear basis, (iv) the ability to pay certain claims at a large discount and/ or over time, (v) the ability to bind holdouts and dissenting creditors in certain situations, and (vi) the ability to reject certain burdensome contracts and leases.  Companies that restructure crippling debt loads can often emerge from bankruptcy and start life anew, but with the latest fall in energy prices, even a freshly capitalized balance sheet may not be enough to save the company

Indeed, bankruptcy by itself does not solve problems such as ongoing revenue and pricing issues or the need for going forward capital and trade creditor support. For example, when Samson Resources filed for bankruptcy in September 2015, wiping out US$4.2 billion of equity, the expectation was that second lien lenders, in the middle of the capital structure, would take over the company, wiping out the junior debt but paying senior debt holders 100 cents on the dollar. Now that assumption is being questioned and the pre-filing agreement with creditors has fallen apart. With the drop in energy prices “elements of the restructuring agreement, including refinancing senior debt and a commitment to inject new money, are likely no longer feasible”, according to a court document filed on December 17, 2015, in Delaware. “Any new restructuring would likely provide significantly less value for stakeholders than the transaction (originally) contemplated.” Second lien lenders who expected to take over Samson had pledged to put US$400 million into the company. But with prices of natural gas less than US$1.75 per million British thermal units —when the investment thesis of the original owners required prices of US$4 per mmbtu —“it was rational to take another look”, said one person involved in the talks. In its attempt to survive, Samson has cut costs and suspended all drilling.

Conclusion

Although the immediate cause of the collapse is over-production of tight oil, the key to recovery is a material increase in demand. Worldwide demand for oil has increased—its just that the rate of increase in demand has dramatically slowed down. The problem is structural and firmly rooted in the speculative money that was funding under-performing US unconventional oil companies since 2010. A possible first step to price recovery is the severing of capital supply to E&P companies that could not fund their operations from cash flow when oil prices were more than US$80 per barrel. If this does not happen, the world could be in for a long period of low oil prices. Until then, distressed investors should remain mindful of the inherent benefits and risk of investing in the E&P space as they evaluate opportunities resulting from this downtown.

The UK’s Contracts for Difference (CfD) regime for renewable subsidies was one of the principal pillars of the Electricity Market Reform programme put in place by the 2010-2015 Coalition Government.  In one way or another, the CfD regime aimed to provide revenue stability for most renewable technologies in projects of more than 5 MW, with consumers sharing in the upside at times when power prices exceed the guaranteed “strike price” set in a competitive allocation process.

Before the UK General Election of May 2015, it was also expected that auctions would follow a regular annual rhythm – or possibly occur more than once a year for some technologies. But things have changed a lot in the last seven months in the world of CfDs – and they continue to change.

• The Conservative Party, victorious in May 2015, had campaigned on a manifesto promise of “no new subsidies for onshore wind”, which they have been quick to implement, and which appears to include the exclusion of onshore wind (except perhaps on Scottish islands) from future CfD auctions.
• On 11 February 2016, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Amber Rudd, told Parliament: “We don’t have plans at the moment for a large-scale solar contract [for difference]“.
• The day before, her Department announced “an independent review into the feasibility and practicality of tidal lagoon energy in the UK” – appearing to cast more than a little doubt over the prospects of the Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon project, with which the Department had previously been said to be negotiating CfD support (tidal lagoon projects, like nuclear ones, fall outside the scope of the competitive CfD allocation framework).
• The news that the European Commission has doubts about the compatibility with EU state aid rules of the proposed CfD for the conversion of a third unit at the Drax coal-fired power station to burning biomass perhaps makes it unlikely that there will be many, or any, more CfDs awarded for this technology.
• Almost a year after the results of the first (delayed) CfD auction were announced, there is no sign as yet of Government gearing up for a second auction any time soon – merely a promise that there will be funding for three more auctions before mid-2020.

To be fair, so far, nothing has been said to suggest that Energy from Waste with CHP, Hydro (up to 50 MW), Landfill Gas, Sewage Gas, Wave, Tidal Stream, Advanced Conversion Technologies, Anaerobic Digestion, Biomass with CHP or Geothermal will not be eligible if and when the second auction finally takes place, but the fact remains that for the foreseeable future, offshore wind appears likely to dwarf all the other CfD-eligible technologies.

In clearing the original CfD rules for state aid purposes, the European Commission noted, as apparently relevant facts, that “All generators producing electricity from renewable energy sources will be able to bid for a CfD on non-discriminatory basis (albeit that some less established technologies will initially benefit from allocated budgets in order to promote their further development).“, and that “in the absence of aid renewable energy technologies will not be deployed at the required scale and pace, as without the aid such projects would not be financially viable.”  This was in keeping with the emphasis in the relevant State Aid Guidelines that an “auctioning or competitive bidding process open to all generators producing electricity from renewable energy sources…should normally ensure that subsidies are reduced to a minimum“, but admitting that “given the different stage of technological development of renewable energy technologies“, technology specific tenders may be allowed “on the basis of the longer-term potential of a given new and innovative technology, the need to achieve diversification; network constraints and grid stability and system (integration) costs“.

The statutory framework for CfD auctions allows the Secretary of State enormous flexibility to determine, at very short notice and in documents which are not subject either to Parliamentary approval or any statutory consultation requirement (the “budget notices” and “allocation frameworks”), which technologies will be eligible for support in a given auction.  However, it must be arguable that a decision effectively to exclude technologies as significant (and competitive) as onshore wind and solar from the allocation process could amount to a change in the CfD rules which should itself be notified to the Commission for state aid approval.  And it is not entirely clear that such exclusions could be – or at any rate have been – justified on the grounds specified in the Guidelines as a basis for technology specific tenders.

A cynic or conspiracy theorist might suspect that the lack of urgency in proceeding to a second CfD auction may not be unrelated to the UK Government’s reluctance to put itself – in advance of a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU – in the position of appearing to have to ask the Commission’s permission (in the form of a state aid clearance for alterations to the CfD rules) not to offer CfDs to technologies that Ministers do not want to subsidise.  But cynics and conspiracy theorists are often wrong.  The Government is perhaps more likely to be just taking its time to consider the future of CfDs more broadly.  For example, in the 11 February 2016 Parliamentary exchanges referred to above, Ministers confirmed that they are looking “very closely” at the seductively labelled and highly fashionable concept of “subsidy-free CfDs” (which means different things to different people, but for one interesting suggestion, see this blog post by Professor Michael Grubb of UCL).

On Saturday, March 19, 2015, the Department of Environment and Climate Change Canada (“ECCC“) published its proposed methodology for estimating the upstream greenhouse gas (“GHG“) emissions associated with “major oil and gas projects” undergoing federal environmental assessments (“proposed methodology“) in the Canada Gazette.

The Government of Canada (“GOC“) announced in late January that it intended to “restore confidence in Canada’s environmental assessment processes”. Dentons’ commentary on that announcement can be found here. As part of that announcement, the GOC articulated five principles for how it would exercise its discretionary decision making authority for projects undergoing federal environmental assessments. Among the five principles was a commitment to assess “upstream greenhouse gas emissions linked to projects under review”. The proposed methodology published in the Canada Gazette has not yet been finalized. Interested parties, including industry stakeholders, have 30 days from the publication date (until April 18) to comment on the proposed methodology.

The proposed methodology begins by providing a definition of what ECCC considers “upstream” for the purposes of its estimating GHGs associated with a project. It then sets out two parts of its proposed approach to assessing upstream GHG emissions.

Defining “upstream”

The proposed methodology defines “upstream” to be all industrial activities from the point of resource extraction to the project under review. Apparently anticipating questions on what this definition means for crude oil pipeline projects, ECCC gives several examples of “upstream” activities for such projects:

• Extraction – crude oil and gas wells and oil sands mining and in situ facilities;
• Processing – field processing and upgrading, if occurring;
• Handling – products transfer at terminals; and
• Transportation – any pipeline operation in advance of the project.

The activities considered “upstream” would depend on the project under review.

The Proposed Methodology

We are told that the assessment of upstream GHGs will consist of two parts. The first part is a relatively straight forward quantitative estimation of emissions released from upstream production associated with the project. The second part is a more opaque “discussion” of the project’s potential impact on Canadian and global GHG emissions.

The quantitative component of the assessment will focus on emissions from upstream activities “exclusively linked” to the project being assessed. How ECCC will decide whether something is “exclusively linked” to a project is unclear. The quantitative assessment will not include “indirect emissions” which, for the purposes of the proposed methodology, would include matters such as manufacture of equipment and fuels “produced elsewhere”.

The quantitative assessment begins by determining expected throughput of each “component” (e.g. heavy oil and diluent as separate components) in the product stream. ECCC will rely on project proponent data for this information. Though not expressly stated, information contained in a publicly available application, such as one filed with the National Energy Board would likely be considered.

Next, each product component will be assigned an emission factor using ECCC emissions data, among other information sources. Because different product components will involve different extraction, processing, handling and transportation activities, the emissions factors applied in a given assessment would reflect those differences.

Multiplying the emissions factor for a given component by the throughput of that component (taking into account a vaguely defined “adjustment”) provides the upstream emission for a given component. Upstream emissions for each component would then be totaled to provide the upstream emissions for the entire project.

The second stage to the proposed methodology is a “discussion” that is intended to accomplish two objectives. First, the discussion will assess conditions under which the upstream emissions associated with the project could be expected to occur even without the project. Second, the discussion will consider the potential impact of the project’s emissions on overall Canadian GHG emissions and on Global GHG emissions.

To inform the discussion, ECCC will examine current production levels, the trajectory of future production with and without the project, as well as potential markets for future resource production.

The next stage of the “discussion” is to evaluate “technical and economic potential” for alternatives to be used in absence of the proposed project. The proposed methodology then considers the various alternatives and “discusses the potential implications for Canadian and Global upstream GHG emissions”.

The outstanding issues

When the GOC first articulated the five principles, including the commitment to assess direct and upstream greenhouse gas emissions, its stated intention was to provide greater certainty on how it would exercise its discretion on projects undergoing a federal environmental assessment. This proposed methodology, once finalized, will give proponents some understanding of how ECCC will assess upstream emissions. However, proponents are arguably no closer to understanding how the GOC will exercise its discretion on individual projects.

The proposed methodology gives only a high level overview of how upstream GHGs will be assessed and is vague in a number of respects. For instance, it is not clear how “the technical and economic potential for alternative modes of transportation” will be evaluated. If a proposed pipeline has more “economic potential” or is considered safer than the hypothetical rail alternative, will that tilt the scale in favour of the proposed project for the purposes of an upstream GHG assessment? The proposed methodology also includes a fleeting reference to comparing emissions intensity between Canadian and non-Canadian crude oil sources. What crude oil sources will be used as the comparator or how “upstream emissions” from those non-Canadian-sources will be quantified is anyone’s guess.

The most significant issue outstanding from the perspective of a project proponent is the lack of guidance on how the National Energy Board, ECCC, or the Governor in Council, as the case may be, will exercise its discretion to approve or recommend approval of a project based on its GHG emissions. Will projects be given a green light regardless of the upstream GHGs they facilitate? At the other end of the spectrum, will any increase in Canadian or global GHG emissions from a project be enough to delay or halt a proposed project? The true answer presumably lies somewhere in the middle. The problem from the prospective of a proponent contemplating a substantial investment is that there is no way to assess this potential roadblock.

On April 4, 2016, the Government of Alberta (“GoA”) released The Government of Alberta’s Policy on Consultation with Metis Settlements on Land and Natural Resource Management, 2015 (the “Policy”) as well as The Government of Alberta’s Guidelines on Consultation with Metis Settlements on Land and Natural Resource Management, 2016 (the “Guidelines”). Additional information on the Policy and the Guidelines including the text of each can be found here.

The modest aim of this post is to outline some of the key features of the Policy and Guidelines as they relate to energy project proponents.

Alberta Metis Settlements

The term “Metis” refers to people of mixed European and indigenous heritage who developed their own customs, way of life, and recognizable group identity separate from their settler or indigenous ancestors. Metis people are expressly included within the definition of “aboriginal peoples of Canada” in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Accordingly, Metis practices that were historically important features of these distinctive communities and that persist today as integral elements of Metis culture are constitutionally protected. According to the Alberta Indigenous Relations website, approximately 5,000 people live on the eight Metis Settlements in the province which collectively cover 1.25 million acres in the central and northern part of the province.

Policy and Guideline Highlights

The stated objective of the Policy is to establish a meaningful consultation process to address potential adverse impacts to Metis Settlement members’ harvesting or traditional use activities. The Guidelines are intended to clarify expectations of all parties participating in the consultation process including project proponents, the Aboriginal Consultation Office (the “ACO”), Metis Settlements, and government agencies.

According to the Policy, and consistent with Supreme Court of Canada decisions on Aboriginal consultation, the GoA policy is to consult with Metis Settlements when:

1. GoA has real or constructive knowledge of Metis Settlement members’ harvesting or traditional use activities;
2. GoA is contemplating a decision relating to land and natural resource management; and
3. a GoA decision has the potential to adversely impact the continued exercise of Metis Settlement members’ harvesting or traditional use activities.

The Policy, therefore, will impact not only strategic resource planning decisions made by the GoA, but also project specific decisions including land dispositions, facility and pipeline approvals, and water use authorizations. It will not, however, apply to leasing or licencing Crown mineral rights.

Borrowing from the GoA’s approach to consultation with First Nations, the Guidelines establish a framework for determining the level of consultation required based on the impact of the project and the sensitivity of the affected location. The level of consultation informs how deep the consultation should be, what process steps are required, and the timelines for completing consultation.

The Policy lists a number of “guiding principles” which it considers will lead to meaningful consultation. These guiding principles will generally not surprise energy project proponents who are accustomed to engaging with First Nations. In some cases, the guiding principles provide reassurance regarding the GoA position on consultation. Notably, the guiding principles include the following:

• Consultation will take place with the Metis Settlements, not their individual members;
• GoA will consult with honour, respect, and good faith, with a view to reconcile Metis Settlement members’ harvesting and traditional use activities with the GoA’s mandate to manage provincial Crown lands and resources for the benefit of all Albertans;
• Consultation requires all parties to demonstrate good faith, reasonableness, openness, and responsiveness;
• Metis Settlements have a reciprocal onus to respond with any concerns specific to the anticipated Crown decision in a timely and reasonable manner and work with Alberta and project proponents to resolve issues as they arise during consultation;
• Consultation does not give Metis Settlements or project proponents a veto over Crown decisions nor is the consent of Metis Settlements or project proponents required as part of Alberta’s Consultation process.

The Policy and Guidelines contemplate direct consultation by the GoA as well as GoA delegation of procedural aspects of consultation. In either case, the ACO will “direct, monitor and support consultation activities”. ACO support includes providing staff to assist with consultation, advising both Metis Settlements and proponents when disputes arise, and evaluating consultation records. Energy project proponents will recall that the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”) has no authority under the Responsible Energy Development Act to assess the adequacy of Crown consultation. In matters before the AER, the ACO will make a consultation adequacy determination and advise the AER of its decision.

For their part, project proponents may need to carry out certain tasks if the GoA decides to delegate procedural aspects of the consultation process. The Guidelines state that “proponents are encouraged to notify and consult with Metis Settlements as early as possible in the pre-application stage”, “document their consultation activities, share their consultation record with Metis Settlements and provincial staff and advise the GoA of any issues that arise”. The Policy and Guidelines identify a number of consultation activities that may be passed to proponents, such as providing Metis Settlements with plain language information on the project, meeting with Metis Settlements to discuss their concerns, developing and implementing mitigation strategies, and preparing consultation records.

Finally, the Guidelines state that “although the optimal outcome of consultation is that all consulting parties reconcile interests, agreement of all parties is not required for consultation to be adequate”.

Comments for Energy Project Proponents

The Policy and Guidelines closely model the GoA’s approach to engaging with First Nations in Alberta and will be familiar to many project proponents. They serve as a useful starting point for setting expectations on how consultation will proceed and the roles of each party. However, they are just that – a starting point.

The Guidelines acknowledge that consultation must remain flexible. They do not state, however, whether Metis Settlements will be consulted on how the Policy will be implemented in any given case. Further, while the Policy and Guidelines clearly contemplate delegating consultation activities to proponents, there is no commitment by the GoA to communicate the fact of delegation to the concerned Metis Settlements.

Clear communication at every stage of the consultation process is important to avoid delays as the process unfolds. Proponents should ensure from the outset when they undertake delegated consultation activities, such as in-person meetings, that the Metis Settlement representatives understand the consultation activities were delegated and are meant to contribute to fulfilling the Crown’s duty to consult.

How much of a difference will the recent reforms of UK offshore oil and gas regulation make to the industry and its stakeholders? It may be too early to say whether the creation of the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA), the articulation of the “MER UK Strategy” and the other changes introduced by the Infrastructure Act 2015 and the Energy Act 2016 will facilitate solutions to all the significant problems faced by North Sea operators, but in our view it is already clear that the changes of the last two years will have a profound impact on the industry.

Government intervention in the UK’s offshore oil and gas industry is nothing new. It has taken different forms at different times, and has included, as well as numerous changes in taxation, Government participation (or at least the ability of Government to participate) in decision-making at the individual asset level through rights granted to state-owned entities.

More specifically, for almost 20 years, Government has been aware of, and has been taking action to address, the particular set of problems that the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) faces as a mature basin.  Between 1999 and 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry and its successors took a series of steps to foster investment and innovation in the industry and improve its efficiency: a joint Government / industry report (A Template for Change) was published in 1999; task forces were appointed; changes were made to the administration of the licensing regime; new types of licence were introduced.

However, by the time that Ed Davey, as Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, commissioned Sir Ian Wood to carry out a review of the industry in 2013 and the Wood Review’s final report was issued early in 2014, it had become clear that all the good work done after the 1999 report had not resolved or prevented some fundamental problems, and that the “vision for 2010” which it articulated had not been fully realised.   Average production efficiency declined from 81% in 2004 to 60% in 2012.  There had been a downward trend in numbers of exploration wells drilled since 2008 (with about 70% fewer being drilled in 2013 than were drilled five years before).  Perhaps worst of all, costs of production per barrel had risen fivefold in ten years.  And all that was before global oil prices began a period of sharp decline which has seen them fall to levels at which most North Sea fields are said to be uneconomic, with no certainty of a rapid or sustained recovery.

Many of the concerns that were articulated in the 1999 report and addressed in the initiatives that followed from are echoed in the Wood Report. Both reports are in favour of such things as “collaboration in place of competition”, “improving relationships between licensees” and encouraging innovation, for example.  But the final results of Wood’s work are very different from those of the earlier report and its follow-up.  Where the 1999 report tends to talk about “deregulation”, the Wood Report has led to the creation of a new, more powerful and better resourced body to regulate the industry.  In the words of the Wood report itself: “In the early days with large fields to be found by major operators, the free market model worked well with a light touch Regulator…However, over time, the number of fields has increased, now to over 300, new discoveries are much smaller, many fields are marginal and very inter dependent, and there is competition for ageing infrastructure. Alongside this, the…Regulator has halved in size in 20 years and…is clearly struggling to perform a more demanding stewardship role.”

There has been general agreement with Wood’s conclusion that “a stronger Regulator with broader skills and capabilities able to significantly enhance the level of co-ordination and collaboration” would “largely resolve” the problems that his review identified.  It is rare for an industry to be so apparently united in its desire for stronger regulation – even if it was clear from the first that a regulator based on Wood’s prescription would be different from many sector regulatory bodies in terms of its remit, composition, and its interactions with industry.  It has probably helped that the fall in oil prices has made the problems identified by Wood more acute, increasing the demand for a powerful independent regulator to get to work on solving them.  This, together with the compelling nature of Wood’s analysis and strong political support, has enabled the necessary legislative changes to be put in place rapidly.

Why do we think that North Sea regulation from now on (or at least from the date on which the relevant provisions of the Energy Act 2016 come into force and the Regulator’s staff complement is up to full strength) will be radically different from what operators have been accustomed to? There are six main reasons.

For the first time, the UK offshore regulatory regime (excluding its environmental and health and safety aspects) has a single governing principle articulated on a statutory basis – the objective of maximising the economic recovery of UK petroleum (MER UK).

Although MER UK is defined in general terms in a strategy promulgated by DECC under the Infrastructure Act 2015, its specific meaning and impact in any given situation will in large measure be determined by the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA).

The obligation to act in accordance with MER UK, as so defined and interpreted, applies – or could be said to apply – to at least one person involved in the taking of almost any commercially important decision in the offshore industry.

Under the new regime, the OGA and DECC will potentially have access to vastly more information about North Sea assets and infrastructure, the commercial intentions of those with interests in them, and the relations between them, than DECC has had to date.

The OGA does genuinely appear to be a new kind of regulator, in terms of its composition, capabilities, culture and combination of functions. It is also likely to take a more proactive approach than its predecessors.

The terms of the MER UK strategy and the robustness of the enforcement tools at the OGA’s disposal suggest that it will enjoy unparalleled leverage over licence holders and others to ensure that collaboration “for the greater good” really does happen.

In future posts in this series, we will explain in more detail how the relevant provisions of the Infrastructure Act 2015, the Energy Act 2016 and the MER UK strategy achieve these results and how we think the application of the new rules by industry parties, DECC and the OGA will affect key moments in the life of North Sea infrastructure and assets.

This is the second in a series of posts on the new regulatory regime for the North Sea oil and gas industry following the enactment of the Energy Act 2016.  In the first post we introduced the new regime.  Here, we look at how its central legal provisions work.

At the heart of the new regime is the concept of “MER UK”.  This is short-hand for the “principal objective” of “maximising the economic recovery of [offshore] UK petroleum”, which is set out in s. 9A of the Petroleum Act 1998 (inserted by the Infrastructure Act 2015).  The way that the principal objective governs both the regulators and those they regulate is summarised below.

Two points are worth emphasising here.

First, obligations to act in accordance with the MER UK strategy apply to a very broad range of persons engaged in a very broad range of activities – the summary above slightly understates this. It does not, for example, have room to list all the categories of offshore installation (e.g. gas storage or accommodation facilities) that are covered.

Second, the key obligations in the legislation refer to the MER UK strategy, rather than the principal objective itself.  This gives DECC (for now) and the OGA (in the future) great flexibility to articulate the practical implications of the principal objective, and to do so in a document that, although it is legally binding, does not have to be (and is not) written with the precision that one would expect to find in legislative drafting.

The position in practice could almost be caricatured as being “you must do what the OGA says you must do to achieve MER UK”.  Courts would probably be reluctant to second-guess the range of factors contributing to an assessment of MER UK in any event, but this feels like a regime which has been very carefully set up with a view to minimizing the risk of administrative law challenges to the regulator’s decisions.

NOTE: The Energy Act 2016 is being commenced in stages, by regulations.  The first commencement regulations were made on 23 May 2016.  So far, only provisions which empower the Secretary of State to make further regulations or transfer schemes (e.g. relating to the transfer of property from DECC to OGA) have been made.  However, the substantive obligations on “relevant persons” and DECC / OGA described above are largely contained in the provisions which the Infrastructure Act 2015 inserted into the Petroleum Act 1998 with effect from 12 April 2015 (even though the MER UK strategy itself was not finalized until almost a year later).

So although it may be a few months before the sections of the Energy Act 2016 that will allow enforcement of MER UK obligations are brought into force by further commencement regulations, the substantive obligations to comply with MER UK principles are already in force and should be kept in mind by relevant persons (and DECC / OGA) in all the situations where they apply.  The next post in this series will explore some of these situations, with particular emphasis on exploration activities.

In November 2015, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to review and recast the English law on penalties, in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67.  The decision has been of particular interest to the oil and gas community, where the enforceability of JOA forfeiture provisions has long been the subject of debate.

The Cavendish ruling was welcomed by English lawyers, coming as it did some 100 years after the previous leading authority, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79.  In the intervening period, English case law had sought to refine the penalties test, with results that were sometimes helpful and at other times confusing.  The result was, according to the Supreme Court, “an ancient, haphazardly constructed edifice which has not weathered well“.

Before Cavendish, any analysis of whether a clause was a penalty would likely have started with Lord Dunedin’s four “tests” from the Dunlop case and his focus on whether the sums payable amounted to a genuine pre-estimate of loss or a deterrent.  Post-Cavendish, the test is now clearer.  The key question is whether the relevant clause is a secondary obligation and, if it is, whether it is out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in its enforcement.

So, the first task is to establish if the obligation is a primary obligation or a secondary obligation.  A primary obligation would, for example, be an obligation to pay for services (even if a part of that payment is contingent on future behaviour, as it was in Cavendish) provided under a contract; a secondary obligation would be an obligation to pay liquidated damages on breach.  Only if the clause is a secondary obligation can it be a penalty, as the English courts will not interfere in the parties’ original commercial bargain.

The second task is then to investigate the legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the clause.  In Cavendish, for example, this focused on the interest of the buyer in ensuring that the seller adhered to certain restrictive covenants to ensure that the goodwill in the value of the company’s shares was preserved.

JOA forfeiture provisions take many forms.  However, most operate on the basis of certain key principles.  First, they apply to circumstances where a contractor has failed to pay its share of costs when due.  Second, they require the other contractors to pay the defaulting contractor’s share of costs, pro rata to their participating interests.  Third, where the default remains unremedied, the defaulting contractor is required to assign (or “forfeit”) some or all of its participating interest to the non-defaulting contractors.

Whether such provisions amount to primary obligations under the JOA will be determined by the wording used.  Generally, those we have seen more naturally fall within the category of secondary obligations.  However, the legitimate interest of the non-defaulting contractors will be similar across most JOAs; the continuity of the operations and compliance with their obligations to the Government that has granted them rights in the given contract area.  The non-defaulting parties will argue with some force that these legitimate interests justify the partial or complete exclusion of a party that is unwilling to bear its share of costs, particularly where the innocent contractors have had to bear those costs themselves.

Whether the forfeiture provisions are proportionate to these legitimate interests will depend on their precise terms and, importantly, the commercial context.  Some commentators have suggested that it may be easier to argue that forfeiture is proportionate where costs incurred are relatively low and the prospects for the contract area uncertain, for instance during the exploration phase of operations.  This is one reason for the range of remedies often to be found in JOAs, where mandatory assignment and withdrawal provisions may be accompanied by buy-out and withering interest options.

It remains to be seen to what extent Cavendish has affected the enforceability of JOA forfeiture provisions.  Whilst the Supreme Court’s focus on legitimate interests over genuine pre-estimate of loss or deterrence is undoubtedly helpful for parties seeking to enforce such provisions, it may be argued that English case law had already been moving in that direction.  More recent case law had, for example, tended to focus on the commercial justification for the sums payable; the legitimate interests test is arguably an extension of this.  Non-defaulting contractors would likely have deployed the same (persuasive) arguments in support of a commercial justification test as they now would in support of their legitimate interests.

Further, two English law principles that are key to analysing JOA forfeiture provisions were established long before Cavendish.  The first is that, where a contract has been negotiated by properly advised parties of comparable bargaining power, there is a strong presumption that they are the best judges of what is legitimate and that the court should therefore not interfere (Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR).  In the sophisticated world of oil and gas exploration and production, the vast majority of contracts will meet this description.

Second, Lord Dunedin made clear in Dunlop that the analysis of whether or not a clause is a penalty must be carried out at the time the contract was entered into, not at the time of breach.  In addition, he emphasised that the fact that it may be difficult to estimate what the true loss would be is no obstacle to enforceability (and may, indeed, be a reason to uphold the parties’ original bargain).  In JOAs, the loss suffered by the non-defaulting contractors as against the value of the interests to be forfeited by the defaulting party may well be difficult (if not impossible) to estimate at the time the JOA is entered into, which may help persuade a court to uphold the terms agreed.