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Keeping the lights on (in lockdown Britain) when the sun is shining


Will some smaller generators find themselves disconnected from the grid during the course of the UK’s upcoming VE Day anniversary bank holiday (8 May 2020)? We look here at an urgent modification to the Grid Code that is intended to facilitate such disconnections – as a measure of last resort.

For some time, it has been clear that on hot, sunny days in summer, balancing maximum output from solar installations and minimum demand for electricity presents a challenge for National Grid ESO (NG ESO) as GB system operator. NG ESO has developed, and continues to develop, a number of ancillary services tools to address this on a commercial basis, providing incentives for other forms of generation to turn down, or demand to turn up, for example.

However, recent falls in overall electricity demand arising from the UK’s current “lockdown” conditions have gone rather further than is usual. The lack of demand from commercial and industrial premises, where businesses are not operating as a result of COVID-19, has not been offset by additional residential sector demand from those who have been furloughed or are working from home. Particularly with the bank holiday looming, NG ESO envisages that it may have to take additional measures, including, as a last resort, disconnecting generators to maintain grid stability.

Where a generator is connected to the distribution, rather than the transmission network, NG ESO has no means of instructing it to disconnect or de-energise. Although in some cases NG ESO will be able to achieve an equivalent result, for example through the Balancing Mechanism, this is not the case with those “embedded generators” that do not have connection agreements with NG ESO and are not otherwise party to industry frameworks such as the Balancing and Settlement Code.

In such cases, the obvious way for NG ESO to achieve disconnection or de-energisation of an embedded generator is by instructing the operator of the distribution network to which it is connected to disconnect or de-energise it. Given the thousands of pages of industry codes to which NG ESO and the DNOs are parties, it might be expected that somewhere there would already be a provision that clearly enables NG ESO to disconnect or de-energise a generator as a measure of last resort in the kind of circumstances that may soon arise (even if the COVID-19 crisis itself is unprecedented).

Arguably, such a provision does exist, but it is expressed in very brief, vague and generic terms. If DNOs are going to be instructed to take such drastic action, it seems appropriate to have clearer and more focused wording. Accordingly, NG ESO put forward on 30 April 2020 an urgent modification to the Grid Code, for which it sought approval by 7 May 2020 (in time for the VE Day Bank Holiday). Ofgem’s decision, granting urgent status and dated 1 May 2020, was published on 5 May; the Grid Code Panel’s recommendation was published on 6 May and Ofgem’s decision approving the modification was published on 7 May 2020.

The main change is time-limited until 25 October 2020. It gives NG ESO the right to issue DNOs instructions requiring them to disconnect embedded generators. This “includes the disconnection of [embedded generators]…which are owned or operated by generators that are not BM Participants”. The instructions may: “i) be specific and require the [DNO] to disconnect specified [embedded generators]; ii) be for the [DNO] to disconnect [embedded generators] supplied via one or more specified Grid Supply Point(s) with an aggregate Registered Capacity of a specified value; or iii) be for the [DNO] to disconnect [embedded generators] supplied via one or more specified Grid Supply Point(s) such that a specified proportion of the aggregate Registered Capacity is disconnected”.

If NG ESO instructs DNOs to de-energise embedded generators, the Distribution Connection and Use of System Agreement would oblige the DNOs to re-energise them “as quickly as reasonably practicable after the circumstances leading to the De-energisation have ceased to exist”. There is no provision for compensation to be paid to generators for any revenue lost during the period of de-energisation (unlike many cases where emergency instructions operate as bid or offer acceptances in the balancing mechanism).

The modification proposal stressed that NG ESO would only exercise its new/clarified right as a last resort, and that it is only a stop-gap solution. As well as considering the development of further ancillary services, NG ESO indicated that in the longer term it intends to develop “a more considered solution…potentially by developing a roughly symmetrical arrangement to the existing demand control conditions contained in section OC6 of the Grid Code”. OC6 is the part of the Grid Code that enables NG ESO to respond to situations of “insufficient Active Power generation being available to meet Demand” on the transmission system by, for example, requiring DNOs to disconnect a certain proportion of demand within their areas on two minutes’ notice. OC6 covers some 10 pages, compared to the 10 or so lines of drafting in the modification.

Industry codes are not noted for their brevity of expression, but it seems likely that some more developed provisions on this point are desirable, even if it is to be hoped they never need to be used. For example, the modification introduces the concepts of disconnecting a certain proportion or amount of embedded generation associated with a particular Grid Supply Point, or a specified embedded generator. This mirrors the concept of rolling disconnection of tranches of demand in OC6, but there is more to be said, perhaps about the basis on which DNOs would exercise any discretion they have in determining how to carry out instructions from NG ESO that are not generator-specific. It may also be appropriate to refer to disconnection of embedded generation in a revised edition of the Balancing Principles Statement that NG ESO is required to produce under condition 16 of its licence. The fact that a proposal submitted at such short notice attracted comments from 69 interested parties in a few days, and the number of questions raised by the Panel in its report on the proposal, also suggest that we are some way from hearing the last word on this subject.

The authors are extremely grateful to Charles Wood for his assistance with this post.

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The clean green gas of home? UK government consults on (initial) successors to RHI


The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) has unveiled in a consultation proposals for a Green Gas Support Scheme, providing support for injecting biomethane into the grid, and a Clean Heat Grant Scheme, offering grants of up to £4,000 to encourage uptake of heat pumps, and in some cases biomass heating. Entitled Future support for low carbon heat, the consultation is one of three linked documents published together on 28 April 2020 which between them set out how BEIS proposes to replace the Renewable Heat Incentive (theRHI) in the short term. The consultation is scheduled to close on 7 July.

Background

The UK is the first major economy in the world to set a legally binding target to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Currently, heating the UK’s homes, businesses and industry, dominated by the burning of fossil fuel, is responsible for approximately one third of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.[1] In its report to government that led to the adoption of the net zero target in 2019, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) highlighted the scale of the challenge that the UK faces in decarbonising heat: currently, the share of heat demand met by low carbon heating needs to increase from around 4.5% today to around 90% in 2050.

Successive UK governments have adopted a number of measures designed to enhance the energy efficiency of buildings (thereby reducing heat demand) and to encourage the installation of more efficient and lower carbon heating equipment. Heat policy is necessarily a complex jigsaw, with important aspects ranging from planning, agricultural and waste policy to industrial strategy, but the RHI has been at the forefront of government heat policy now for some 10 years. It aims to encourage the production of biomethane (enabling the supply of gas through the gas grid to become “greener”) and the installation of low carbon heating equipment such as heat pumps and biomass boilers.

The intention was that the RHI would do for renewable heating technologies what subsidies for renewable electricity generation (like the UK’s Renewables Obligation and Feed-in Tariffs regimes, and their counterparts in other jurisdictions) have done for solar panels and wind turbines: make installing them financially attractive to a mass market, thereby stimulating demand and bringing costs down, allowing subsidy costs to decline over time and demand to increase in a virtuous circle. However, it has not proved easy to replicate in the heat sector what worked so well in the power sector.

The RHI has done much to build the supply chains for a range of low carbon heating technologies, but it cannot be said to have had a transformative effect on the market.

  • At a high level, in the words of the CCC’s net zero report: “Over ten years after the Climate Change Act was passed, there is still no serious plan for decarbonising UK heating systems and no large-scale trials have begun for either heat pumps or hydrogen.”
  • More specifically, the RHI has been criticised for failure to provide value for money, and falling short of the levels of deployment that it was originally expected to achieve (see in particular the 2018 report of House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) on the RHI).[2]
  • Whilst an incentive scheme like the RHI is only one element in determining the uptake of low carbon heating technologies, and all national energy markets are different, the UK’s recent performance in this area is not particularly impressive by European standards. In 2018, 10 times as many heat pumps were purchased in France as in the UK, while Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, whose combined population is less than half that of the UK, purchased more than 13 times as many heat pumps as the UK between them.[3]

Renewable Heat Incentive

The RHI is a UK government scheme established to encourage uptake of and investment in low carbon heat technologies through financial incentives. It is the first renewable heat incentive scheme in the world. There are separate schemes for domestic and commercial projects, that were introduced in 2011 and 2014, respectively. The RHI provides quarterly payments to individuals or organisations for the generation of heat from several different renewable energy sources, including biomass boilers and plants, ground source heat pumps, water source heat pumps and solar thermal or (for non-domestic RHI) injecting biomethane into the gas grid.

Under the RHI, Ofgem pays quarterly support payments to participants for a period of seven years (for Domestic RHI) or 20 years (for Non-Domestic RHI). The payments are calculated according to the particular RHI tariff that applies to the installation at the time it was installed. Such payment is intended to cover the additional capital and running costs of renewable heat installations (compared to traditional installations). The government initially set the level of tariffs to achieve a 12% rate of return on additional capital invested (except for solar thermal).

Some notable features of the RHI are: 

  • Tariff guarantees, which allow RHI applicants to secure a tariff rate before an installation is commissioned and fully accredited by Ofgem or before biomethane for injection into the grid has been produced.
  • RHI payment rates are subject to a degression mechanism (if triggered), a pre-determined monthly downward adjustment of tariff levels for new installations where uptake of RHI technologies is greater than forecast. This cost control measure is intended to bring deployment down so that it is within anticipated levels.
  • Non-domestic RHI payments cannot be assigned and transferred to allow a third party (e.g. a lender) to directly receive the payments, unless there is a change of ownership.

Seen from the perspective of the consumer of heat, the RHI has a number of drawbacks – or perhaps it would be fairer to say that it does not go far enough to overcome the factors that may inhibit take-up of technologies such as heat pumps.

  • Beyond the satisfaction of “being green”, consumers’ decisions to switch to renewable heat are likely to be influenced by the prospect of saving money by switching to low carbon heat. They will only have this if they first replace their existing equipment (typically a gas boiler) withrenewable technology, and then make savings that pay back the capital cost of the new equipment over a period that makes sense to them.
  • The RHI makes no upfront contribution to the costs of equipment purchase and installation, which consumers must incur before they can be eligible for RHI payments.
  • Consumers’ calculations of potential payback will therefore have to be based entirely on their anticipated levels of RHI payments over time: how many years will it take to get their money back? The answer is that they cannot always be certain. There are a number of potential complexities involved in making the necessary calculations under the RHI, and until consumers receive accreditation from Ofgem, they cannot be sure that they will in fact receive the particular level of payments on which they may have based their calculations when deciding to move to renewable heating and enter into any associated financing for the purchase of equipment.[4]

The RHI was due to close to new applications on 31 March 2021, but in the March 2020 budget it was announced that the closure date for the Domestic RHI would be deferred until 31 March 2022. The Non-Domestic RHI will close to new applications on 31 March 2021. This was confirmed in a notice published alongside the consultation. A second consultation published at the same time sets out further detail on the closure of the Non-Domestic RHI and other aspects of its future operation (including a third allocation of tariff guarantees with a flexible commissioning deadline). In the remainder of this post, we focus on the consultation about the schemes that will replace the RHI.[5] 

The proposals

BEIS’s consultation introduces proposals (the Proposals) for a Green Gas Support Scheme and a Clean Heat Grant, each mirroring aspects of the current RHI scheme. In broad terms:

  • the Green Gas Support Scheme replaces the Non-Domestic RHI in so far as it has been a supply-side measure relating to the production of biomethane, and is similar in structure to the RHI in that it would involve the payment of a tariff per kWh of gas; and
  • the Clean Heat Grant replaces the Non-Domestic and Domestic RHI as a demand-side subsidy for heat pumps and biomass heating, but rather than providing payments per kWh of renewable heat, it would take the form of a (probably) capped grant towards the cost of purchasing and installing the equipment, rather than payments per kWh of renewable heat.

Green Gas Support Scheme

Biomethane injection into the gas grid accelerates the decarbonisation of gas supplies, and is a necessary step towards meeting the UK’s net zero greenhouse gas emissions target. The proposed Green Gas Support Scheme seeks to increase the proportion of green gas in the grid through support for injection of biomethane produced through anaerobic digestion (AD). The potential importance of biomethane can be seen from the estimates made in a report prepared for the Energy Networks Association (ENA) in 2019 (Pathways to Net-zero: Decarbonising the Gas Networks in Great Britain). Looking at what the position might be in 2050, this considered a “Balanced Scenario”, where “[g]as demand volumes are approximately 50% of present levels with hydrogen and biomethane supplying 240 TWh and 200 TWh respectively” and an “Electrified Scenario”, where “gas plays a more limited role delivering a combined 220 TWh of energy demand between hydrogen and biomethane, equivalent to 25% of today’s gas volumes” (but still a lot of biomethane). To put these figures in context, in 2018, biomethane accounted for 0.4% of UK gas supply.

The proposed scheme focuses support on biomethane because currently biomethane is the only green gas commercially produced in the UK. However, BEIS acknowledges that to further decarbonise the gas grid, it may be appropriate to widen support to other green gases in the longer term and therefore invites views on what mechanisms might be appropriate for longer-term green gas support, and on the potential for including alternative sources of green gas, such as hydrogen blending, in the future. One advantage of biomethane is that its physical properties are more or less the same as those of methane from natural gas. Accordingly, introducing it into the gas grid does not require the kinds of significant commercial and regulatory changes that would be likely to be required to take account of hydrogen blending (hydrogen and methane being very different molecules).

Tariff tiers and periods

BEIS highlights in the Proposals the need to balance incentivising continued AD deployment and delivering value for money to taxpayers. To incentivise AD deployment, a three-tier tariff mechanism for AD plants, which closely mirrors the RHI tariff mechanism, is proposed. This is based on volumes of gas injected into the grid and aims to reflect the different costs of producing different volumes of biomethane. Under the RHI scheme, the highest tariff is available for the first 40,000 MWh of eligible biomethane injected into the grid over a 12-month period (Tier 1). BEIS understands that, in AD plants that have been commissioned since RHI tiering was introduced, more than 90% of biomethane is produced under Tier 1. To encourage the development of larger AD plants that can achieve better economies of scale, under the Green Gas Support Scheme BEIS proposes to increase the Tier 1 limit to 60,000 MWh.

However, to lower total costs and ensure better value for public money, and to reflect developments in AD technology, BEIS is exploring the possibility of a 10- to 12-year tariff period (the RHI period is 20 years). A shorter tariff period may run the risk of undermining the principle of encouraging investment in AD deployment, given that an insufficient tariff period could impact project bankability and discourage AD plant developers by potentially rendering debt repayments unmanageable. 

Tariff changes and guarantee budget cap

The Proposals aim to retain a degression mechanism, building on the mechanism under the RHI. However, BEIS aims to make the mechanism more cost-effective and suggests adjusting the frequency and size of degressions. Although degression under the RHI, alongside tariff guarantees, provided some certainty for investors, it is worth noting that the biomethane tariff has also been reduced outside the degression mechanism a number of times.

BEIS proposes to replicate the RHI tariff guarantee mechanism. However, a tariff guarantee budget cap is also proposed to temporarily halt new tariff guarantee approvals if the cap is reached.

As the impact assessment that accompanies the consultation points out, payments under the scheme are not the only revenue stream for AD plants producing biomethane. They are assumed to receive a payment for their gas (at market rates) and – to the extent that they use waste as a feedstock – they will also receive a “gate fee” (although the impact assessment indicates that it may be difficult for individual plants to secure long-term fixed-price contracts with waste contractors). There is also an emerging market in green gas certificates (not, as yet, it would appear backed on the demand-side by any particularly strong segment of consumer demand specifically for green gas).

Waste feedstock requirements and sustainability

In general, BEIS intends to reflect the existing RHI sustainability criteria (as they apply to feedstock for biomethane) in the Green Gas Support Scheme. However, the consultation document also raises two questions about these criteria.

The Proposals stress the advantages of food waste as a feedstock for AD plants, due to the significant carbon savings achieved by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the waste compared, for example, to sending it to landfill. Further, diverting food waste to AD contributes to England meeting its target to work towards eliminating food waste to landfill by 2030. While the Proposals acknowledge the fluctuating nature of food waste and cite energy crops (a key alternative feedstock, along with sewage and manure) as having practical importance for many biomethane producers by providing a stable feedstock supply and producing a higher yield of biogas, the Proposals state that BEIS is keen to promote the use of waste feedstocks due to the greater environmental benefits.

The Proposals refer to separate food waste collections in Wales and Scotland and the recently published Environment Bill, which would require that every household and business in England has a separate collection for food waste, so that this can be recycled. BEIS expects the Environment Bill measures to commence from 2023 and that this will significantly increase the amount of separately collected food waste available for AD. 

However, having made all these points, the Proposals do not definitely propose an increase on the proportion of biomethane feedstock that is required to be made up of waste under the RHI (50%). They simply ask for views on whether it should be increased under the new scheme, and if so what a suitable new figure should be.

The second question is a more technical one: whether the new scheme should mirror the sustainability criteria of the revised EU Renewables Directive (RED II). Not doing so could be an early exploitation of the freedom to depart from previously binding EU rules following Brexit.

Green Gas Levy

Like the March 2020 Budget, the consultation states that the Green Gas Support Scheme will be funded by a Green Gas Levy. This is to be the subject of further consultation, and the present consultation does not disclose any further details.

The funding of the scheme is of some importance. The RHI has been funded directly by government and therefore effectively by taxpayers rather than by energy bill-payers via a levy on licensed suppliers, as has been the case with most of the UK’s electricity subsidy programmes.

The imposition of such levies on electricity suppliers has been a material factor in the retail price of electricity in a way that has not really been paralleled in relation to the supply of gas. If a Green Gas Levy were added to consumer gas bills, it would probably not increase them greatly over the life of the Green Gas Support Scheme but, in the longer term and on a larger scale, measures that make gas more expensive for consumers could help to persuade them that they would save money by installing heat pumps, which run on electricity. It is worth noting in this context that the enabling powers under which the RHI legislation is made, and under which the consultation implies that the secondary legislation for the new scheme would also be made (s.100 of the Energy Act 2008), does make provision for the funding of heat subsidy payments out of a levy on “designated fossil fuel suppliers”.

A short-lived scheme?

The Green Gas Support Scheme is presented as something of a stop-gap measure, running only from 2021/22 to 2025/26. The consultation anticipates further consultation (it does not say when) on what mechanisms might be appropriate for longer-term green gas support. It raises, by way of example, the possibility of a “supplier obligation” scheme like the Renewables Obligation for electricity (under which licensed suppliers would presumably be obliged to purchase quantities of green gas proportionate to their shares of supply), and of Contracts for Difference (a model already used for low carbon electricity and possibly about to be adapted to fit the context of carbon capture and storage from non-power generating industrial emitters).

Over about 20 years, renewable subsidy regimes have helped to increase the UK’s renewable electricity generation to a point where it accounts for more than a third of UK electricity. Could the successor to the Green Gas Support Scheme have a similarly dramatic impact on the production of biomethane, and perhaps also hydrogen – as it would need to do in order to start to move towards the levels of green gas required in Net Zero scenarios contemplated in the report for ENA quoted above?

Clean Heat Grant

The Clean Heat Grant is most obviously a replacement for the Domestic RHI, which is closing to new applicants on 31 March 2022. The Clean Heat Grant Scheme is expected to begin in April 2022 with funding committed for two years, to March 2024. The scheme aims to provide support for heat pumps and in certain circumstances biomass to provide space and water heating, through an upfront capital grant to help address the barrier of upfront cost. The scheme is targeted at homes and small non-domestic buildings. Although it is in principle available in industrial and commercial contexts, the level of funding being made available is likely to mean that its main impact is on the domestic market.

BEIS proposes that the scheme will be administered by Ofgem. Like the RHI (and unlike the Green Gas Support Scheme), it would be funded directly by government (i.e. by taxpayers, not bill-payers).

The key features of the scheme are:

  • delivering support through an upfront grant scheme;
  • a voucher system for grant delivery, designed to target the upfront cost barrier;
  • supporting domestic and non-domestic installations up to a capacity of 45 kW;
  • providing a flat-rate grant across different technology types;
  • a recommended support level of £4,000; and
  • criteria for ensuring biomass heating is only installed in properties deemed not suitable for a heat pump.

The proposed flat rate £4,000 grant does not scale with system size or change across technology types. However, an upfront scheme would provide more certainty of funding than under the Domestic RHI. The Proposals state that this structure would allow the market to identify which technology is the most cost-effective for each property, and that it expects that for the majority of applicants this will be air-source heat pumps. £4,000 would probably not finance the whole cost of a heat pump, but it might in some cases represent about 50% or more of the cost of an air-source heat pump (one of the cheaper eligible technologies), and so should have a material impact on consumers’ calculations of payback periods.

Although the Clean Heat Grant is a welcome proposal from an upfront costs perspective, the Proposals state that BEIS will have the right to review the grant levels in response to unforeseen market changes or “if uptake falls substantially outside the expected range“. Aside from this, the Proposals introduce a number of funding controls as part of the Clean Heat Grant Scheme: the allocation of grants through quarterly grant windows and a cap on the amount of grants against a pre-agreed budget cap. These proposed limits to the grant scheme have attracted early criticism from the renewable heat industry. For example, a market participant has commented that “we were disappointed by the lack of extension for new non-domestic RHI projects and the implications the cap on the future grant scheme will have. Both of which could result in businesses being unable to finish their projects or continue to operate at a time when the industry needs to be bolstered to achieve our legally binding Net-Zero targets[6]. Further, the proposed voucher system for the delivery of the grant will be issued on a first come, first served basis.

Focus on heat pumps

The Proposals refer to the CCC’s recommendation to increase deployment of heat pumps significantly in the 2020s to deliver its interim carbon budgets, replace high carbon fossil fuel systems off gas grid and set the UK on course for net zero emissions. The CCC has also suggested that the UK would require 15 million homes to be fitted with heat pumps or hybrid heat pumps by 2035.

The Proposals’ focus on heat pumps acknowledges their key role in decarbonising heat. The Proposals state that “heat pumps are one of the primary technologies for decarbonising heat. Looking towards 2050, heat pumps could enable us to almost completely decarbonise heat alongside the decarbonisation of electricity generation“. Further, the Proposals note that “buildings off gas grid have a large proportion of the most polluting heating from oil and coal, and will not benefit from any measures to green the gas grid” and that heat pumps are suitable for a wider range of buildings than biomass, although biomass is also supported under the scheme for buildings in which a heat pump is not suitable.

BEIS does not currently propose that process heating, biogas combustion, solar thermal, hybrid heat pump systems and heat networks will be supported by the Clean Heat Grant Scheme.

Compliance

BEIS acknowledges in the Proposals the need for “a consistent, long-term policy framework and is clear that regulations will be needed to underpin the transformation of our building stock“. In relation to the Proposals, BEIS suggests a participant compliance regime for the Green Gas Support Scheme and the Clean Heat Grant Scheme, managed by Ofgem. The compliance regime for the Green Gas Support Scheme is expected to be based closely on the existing RHI compliance regime. The compliance regime for the Clean Heat Grant Scheme is expected to differ from the current RHI regime for heat pumps and biomass, but would involve Ofgem having the ability to carry out on-site checks of eligibility, and to require remedial work or recoup grant payments in cases of non-compliance.

Next steps

The consultation is only the start of a process. New legislation will be required to establish the two new renewable heat support schemes set out in the Proposals. The experience of the RHI provides a precedent for the Green Gas Support Scheme (although not the Green Gas Levy to fund it); the Clean Heat Grant could be modelled on earlier grant-based renewable energy funding schemes. Guidance will also need to be provided, particularly on the Clean Heat Grant, to ensure that consumers understand what they are being offered. There are plenty of details to iron out (and details matter in such schemes), but there is a bit more than a year before the first scheme is expected to come into force, so it should be possible to have everything ready in good time.

However, as noted above, these two schemes are part of a much bigger emerging picture of heat policy. The consultation notes, for example, that BEIS’s Heat and Buildings Strategy, which it aims to publish later this year, will lay out the immediate actions it will take for reducing emissions from buildings, and that the Future Homes Standard, to be introduced by 2025, will require new build homes to be “future proofed” with low carbon heating and “world-leading” levels of energy efficiency.

Other live initiatives include BEIS’s proposals to regulate heat networks, and the Industrial Energy Transformation Fund, aimed at energy-intensive industries. Perhaps the most exciting prospect opened up by the consultation, though, is of discussion on the future opening up of a green gas market support scheme that could include hydrogen as well as biomethane – formidable though the technical chllenges of designing such a scheme would be.


[1] BEIS (2018) Heat decarbonisation: overview of current evidence base, Fig.2.1 

[2] Paragraph 4 of the PAC report is as follows: “The Department originally expected the RHI to fund 513,000 installations by 2020 at a cost of £47 billion over the lifetime of the scheme [ending in 2041]. By the end of December 2017, more than six years after the start of the non-domestic scheme and more than three years after the start of the domestic scheme, the RHI had funded just 78,048 installations. At current rates of uptake, the scheme will fund 111,000 new installations by 2020–21, 78% less than the number initially intended. The Department expects the cost of the scheme to fall from £47 billion to £23 billion, 51% less than initially planned. The expected total renewable heat production resulting from the scheme has also been reduced by 65%, from 61 TWh to 21 TWh per year by 2020; and total carbon emissions reductions over the life of the RHI have been reduced by 44%, from 246 MtCO2e to 137 MtCO2e.”

[3] Figures from the European Heat Pump Association: see slide 12 of the presentation at https://www.ehpa.org/fileadmin/red/09._Events/2019_Events/Market_and_Statistic_Webinar_2019/20190624_-_EHPA_Webinar_outlook_2019_-_Thomas_Nowak.pdf.

[4] For an admittedly extreme example, see the case of R (on the application of Farmiloe) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and another [2019]. The claimant spent more than £240,000 on a renewable heat installation, in anticipation of receiving quarterly RHI payments of more than £8,000. However, he was at risk of receiving payments worth only about 13% of the original estimate because of changes to the scheme and its technical methodology.

[5] Please see Changes to the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) schemes for more information.

[6] Frank Gordon, head of policy at the REA (see his comments in the final paragraph of this article).]

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Game changer hydrogen – Global Energy Blog


June 2020

Hydrogen has long been on the political agenda on a national and European level. Being pushed by the Green Deal of the European Commission, hydrogen is now on the way to become an overall game changer for German industry. As part of a €130 billion heavy economic stimulus package, the German Federal Government has allocated the substantial amount of €9 billion for the hydrogen sector, in addition to the existing hydrogen-related investments and R&D programs. This stimulus package together with the National Hydrogen Strategy (Nationale Wasserstoffstrategie), which were passed on the June 3 and 10, 2020 respectively, provide an enormous boost for the hydrogen market. The German Government aims to generate 5 GW of electrolyzer capacity by 2030 and an additional 5 GW later on.

Through this program, the German Federal Government acknowledges the key role which hydrogen can play in taking energy markets to the next level by coupling gas and electricity, facilitating the integration of renewables, and providing decarbonization solutions for the mobility sector and carbon-heavy industries such as chemicals, petrochemicals and steel. Highlighting its huge economic potential and existing capabilities, hydrogen is seen as an opportunity to mitigate the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and to help the country emerge even stronger from the crisis.

Read the full article

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Thomas Schubert

About Thomas Schubert

Thomas Schubert, LL.M. (Boston) is a partner in Dentons’ Berlin office. He is part of the Corporate/M&A as well as Venture Technology groups. Thomas focusses on advising national and international companies and investors on M&A transactions, corporate reorganizations and insolvencies.



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A New Chapter in Irish Renewables: Ireland’s Green Energy Auction Results


Green energy auction results (RESS 1)

4 August 2020 marked another significant step forward for the new Irish government in implementing policies designed to transform the national power system towards a greener and more sustainable future. On that day, EirGrid (the state-owned company that manages and operates Ireland’s all-island transmission grid) published the eagerly awaited provisional results for the Renewable Electricity Support Scheme 1 (RESS 1) auction process, just two weeks after the scheme was approved by the European Commission under the EU state aid rules.

This government-backed, green power auction is the first of a number that are due to be held over the coming years and forms a central part in achieving Ireland’s national goal of moving away from fossil fuels and reaching a 70% share of renewables in its electricity mix by 2030, as well as its longer-term objective of carbon neutrality by 2050. The background to these targets, and the RESS auctions, can be found in key policy documents such as the Government’s Climate Action Plan (2019) and the recently published Programme for Government (2020).

Wind farms (x19) and solar power projects (x63)

Results for RESS 1 show that solar and onshore wind projects with a combined capacity of 1,275.5 MW were declared provisionally successful in Ireland’s first tender for renewable energy capacity. The projects to be awarded contracts include 19 new wind farms and 63 new solar power projects. RESS takes the form of a two-way contract for difference. Average strike prices set by the auction were €74.08/MWh for all projects, €72.92/MWh for solar projects and €104.15/MWh for community projects. As the auction was run on a pay-as-bid basis, there could be a wide range of prices for successful projects.  

Approved schemes range in capacity from more than 100 MW to less than 1 MW, and size from 20 acres up to nearly 400 acres. They are located predominantly in the south and east of the country. For projects awarded contracts in the RESS 1 auction, the support typically applies for approximately 15 years. At present, these RESS auctions have an estimated total budget of up to €12.5 billion through until 2025.

Uptake in solar

Interestingly, as can be seen in the map below, solar projects accounted for the largest number of applications and awards at RESS 1. Of the 75% of applicants who succeeded in gaining provisional approval at the auction process, 77% of these were solar projects. This is a significant but not surprising development as the previous decade was dominated by development of onshore wind projects in Ireland with little to no investment in solar or any other form of renewables. While there is still room for additional investment in the market for onshore wind in Ireland, we expect applications for solar projects to be a more common feature of RESS auctions going forward.

What next?

The provisional auction results are pending government approval in accordance with the reserved rights of the Minister for Communication, Climate Action and Environment as set out in Section 10 of the RESS 1 Terms and Conditions. Participants had the opportunity to file a Notice of Dissatisfaction by 6 August 2020 and the final results will be announced on 10 September 2020, with the awards to be made on 25 September 2020. All in all, the success of this inaugural green energy auction is a positive sign of what is yet to come for the renewable energy sector in Ireland.

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WHAT THE UK GOVERNMENT’S TEN POINT PLAN MEANS FOR CCUS


This week, the Prime Minister laid out a Ten Point Plan (TPP) for “Building back better, supporting green jobs, and accelerating our path to net zero”. The policy paper published after the announcement[1] provides more detail than was initially announced. This note briefly considers its implications for the nascent Carbon Capture Usage & Storage (CCUS) industry. In this case, building back better means more public money to do more, more quickly. We have written another post about the rest of the TPP.

Background: The Chancellor’s March 2020 Budget speech committed “at least £800 million” of public funding in a CCS Infrastructure Fund for CCUS. It also set targets of delivering an operational CCUS cluster by the mid-2020s, and a having a second cluster, as well as an electricity consumer-funded CCS power station, operational by 2030[2] (2020 Budget Deliverables). It is important to understand that this £800 million is almost certainly intended as capital funding, i.e. support for the capital cost of developing CCUS facilities. The considerable volume of emerging policy material published by BEIS since 2017 – most recently its business models publication in August 2020 – is clear that the government is also fully expecting to establish revenue funding mechanisms which, ultimately, will inevitably provide industry with many £billions of operational funding.

Some may have speculated that the anticipated squeeze on public spending as a consequence of the huge spending on the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic might have delayed or hampered its ability to fund CCUS. BEIS’s August 2020 publications – which confirmed the budget funding and deliverables and explained how policy will unfold over the next period – suggested that perhaps such speculation was unfounded. So too did the Prime Minister’s recent speech in which he confirmed his recent conversion to become “a complete evangelist” for the CCUS cause.[3]

However, history in relation to major public spending shows, and in relation to Carbon Capture & Storage in particular, that “it isn’t over until the fat lady – in this case the resident of Number 11 Downing Street – sings”. What can be committed in one Budget speech can be taken away in the next.

The Ten Point Plan: Well, history also shows that “there’s no zealot like a convert”. The Prime Minister’s TPP broadly doubles the 2020 Budget Deliverables, albeit with only a 20% increase in committed public funding. This personal commitment would seem to assure the committed funding and so the early stage development of UK CCUS (at least until the next election). The TPP also promises an energy White Paper in 2020, so detailed policy is to be made rapidly to start implementing the plan.

As with policy, so with the lingua franca. Goodbye CCUS clusters, hello “SuperPlaces” (“hubs where renewable energy, CCUS and hydrogen congregate”).[4]

The new CCUS TPP Deliverables are to meet the stated ambition[5] “to capture 10Mt of CO2 a year by 2030”. They are to:

  • “invest £1 billion[6] to support CCUS in four industrial clusters, creating SuperPlaces in places such as the North East, the Humber, North West, Scotland and Wales”;
  • establish CCUS in two industrial clusters by the mid-2020s;[7] and
  • aim for four of these sites by 2030.[8]

In addition, the TPP:

  • confirms the CCS Infrastructure Fund, now at £1 billion;
  • confirms that there will be a revenue mechanism for industrial carbon capture and hydrogen projects, presumably those foreshadowed in the BEIS 2019 publications and the more recent August 2020 ones;[9]
  • broadly confirms the approximate timetable published by BEIS in its August 2020 publications for policy finalisation on the business models for CCUS (in 2022); and
  • reconfirms the ever-present mantra, “subject to relevant value for money and affordability considerations”.

Commentary: In 2020, we have developed around 100 pages of analysis of the law and policy surrounding CCUS. We have speculated that the 2020 Budget Deliverables were challenging, requiring the government to implement rapid and overlapping processes of policy development, law making, investor-selection and transaction execution. We posed around 60 key questions to be answered by those processes before CCUS would become investable and, where desired by the government, bankable.

The TPP does not answer any of these questions – it is not that sort of document – but they will need answering soon. Even if a doubling of ambition may not double the BEIS workload, it will increase it significantly. Finalising policy, making law to create powers and regulatory frameworks, starting work to establish new, or repurpose existing, institutions, establishing and applying selection/investment criteria, running a process to due diligence and receive proposals from individual projects and negotiation transactions to closing by around end 2023, to allow operation of two clusters in 2027[10] is a big ask. We also speculated that the government might be expected to develop some form of competitive process to select the project(s) to be funded for mid-2020s operation, and would be very likely to do so for the project(s) to be developed by 2030. While, in principle, we would expect the government to be keen to use competitive tension to secure value for money for its investment in the initial projects, it may be that the doubling in the TPP of the 2020 Budget Deliverables will reduce the focus on this aspect of the process for the first two clusters to be funded. First, there may be relatively few projects that are capable of being sufficiently “shovel-ready” within this timescale. Second, a competitive process is likely to be slower, and more labour intensive, than simply negotiating with selected projects.

However, this may not be straightforward for BEIS. If the process will involve choosing winners and losers (i.e. if more project(s) seek funding than are awarded it), BEIS will need to be able to justify objectively how it separates the winners from the losers, or risk its decisions being challenged by the losers. And public policy about how the government commits public funds militates strongly in favour of using competition to assure value for money where possible. One method of mitigating this perceived risk to value for taxpayer money would be to structure the initial projects largely on an emerging costs basis, where most of the cost risk and all of the market risk inherent in developing and operating the projects sits with the government. However, this would also imply a much lower level of return, reflecting that risk allocation, for the investors in those projects than they may expect.

The position is further complicated by Brexit. The “level playing field”, still very much a live issue between the UK and the EU in the trade negotiations, relates in part to what, if anything, will replace the current “state aid” rules. The public funding for CCUS projects will need to go through whatever subsidy control process applies in the UK in place of EU state aid rules and, until a long-term competitive process for allocation of CCUS funding is established, this would be on a per project basis. One of the factors that can smooth the process of securing necessary approvals is to demonstrate that an open competition was used to select the investors/projects to be supported.

Whatever the outcome of the ongoing UK-EU trade negotiations, the CCUS funding arrangements will benefit from EU consent, or at least acquiescence. If there is a deal, it may include the UK at least making some commitments acceptable to the EU about the principles on which its authorities will authorise subsidy schemes, even if they are free from the requirement to seek European Commission approval for such schemes. Even if there is no UK-EU trade deal, under the “WTO terms” which would apply in that situation, the EU and others would be able to challenge certain kinds of subsidy (including those that are contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods), within the framework of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Subsidy for clean energy technology has been a highly contentious subject in international trade for some time.

If BEIS does deploy a degree of competition in its selection process, the doubling of ambition in the TPP presumably doubles the prospects of success for each project that can meet BEIS’s selection criteria. Whether or not there is competitive process, BEIS will need to implement a highly collaborative process, as one that is not collaborative will not deliver the ambition.

It will also be necessary for the CCUS (and hydrogen) funding arrangements to be harmonised with UK fiscal policy. Very shortly, the UK government has to decide whether to adopt a UK version of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) or a Carbon Emissions Tax to replace the EU ETS as the primary instrument for the pricing of greenhouse gas emissions in the UK after the EU ETS ceases to apply to GB (participation in the EU ETS will continue in Northern Ireland because of the all-Ireland Single Electricity Market).[11] For any business in a SuperPlace, the decision to participate in CCUS will be based on avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions costs as well as any government financial support, and so certainty about the mode and levels of future carbon prices is essential.

Clearly, the TPP is a very positive development for industry. CCUS professionals in both the public sector and industry can expect to be busy for the foreseeable future.



[1] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/936567/10_POINT_PLAN_BOOKLET.pdf

[2] Budget 2020, HM Treasury, 11 March 2020.

[3] Prime Minister’s speech to virtual UN climate round table, October 2020.

[4] TPP page 10.

[5] In point 8 of the TPP from page 22.

[6] This is an increase of 20% of the £800 million pledged in the 2020 Budget.

[7] This doubles to mid-2020s commitment in the 2020 Budget Deliverables.

[8] Again, this is double the 2020 Budget Deliverable.

[9] It is not yet clear whether the BEIS August 2020 publications on business models described the revenue mechanisms which will actually be implemented. This may become clearer when the promised 2020 energy White Paper is published, though the TPP suggests this may not become clear until 2021.

[10] This is probably just about “mid-2020s”.

[11] The government has consulted on both options (see https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/the-future-of-uk-carbon-pricing and https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/carbon-emissions-tax.

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Levelling up to Net Zero: Boris Johnson’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution


On 18 November 2020, the UK government set out a “ten point plan” for helping to achieve its goal of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Prime Minister Boris Johnson gave his own account of this in an article in the Financial Times. There is clearly much more detail to come from the government in the areas covered by the plan, not least in an imminent Energy White Paper, a Net Zero Strategy and a series of sector or issue-specific strategies signposted in the plan, but we set out here some first thoughts on the agenda that is emerging. We start by focusing on the “ten points” themselves.

1. “The Saudi Arabia of wind”

What’s the plan? The aim to have 40GW of UK offshore wind by 2030 goes back at least as far as the Conservative manifesto for last year’s general election. It suggests that the next two to three CfD auctions would need to provide a basis for more than 20GW of new projects between them, which in turn possibly implies that each auction would support about twice as much offshore wind capacity as the 2019 allocation round. Future CfD allocation rounds will feature “more stringent requirements for supply chains” to maximise the UK jobs benefit.

What’s next? The key to achieving these high ambitions will be reducing the costs of existing, fixed-bottom offshore wind technology and rapidly commercialising and scaling up the floating technologies that could expand significantly the range of areas where offshore wind projects can be located: see our new article on this. This will require some changes to the CfD framework (the government’s response to a consultation on these is expected soon). Also important is the BEIS/Ofgem review of offshore transmission: an update on this is promised by the end of the year, and “clarity on an enduring approach in 2021”.

2. “Water into energy”: £500 million for hydrogen

What’s the plan? The UK joins other countries (and the EU) in setting a medium-term target for the production of low carbon hydrogen: in this case, 5GW by 2030, including “a town heated entirely by hydrogen”. So far, low carbon hydrogen has figured in UK government policy mostly as a subset of the proposed development of industrial clusters built around carbon capture and usage/storage (CCUS), with an emphasis on “blue” hydrogen (produced from natural gas, with CCUS), rather than “green” hydrogen (produced by electrolysis of water using renewable electricity). The prominence given to hydrogen in the “ten point plan” and the choice of language are welcome evidence that low carbon hydrogen (of both “colours”) is now being considered as a key area of net zero policy in its own right. The promised £500 million funding appears to be split roughly equally between the supply and demand sides. With a further £4 billion of private investment to 2030, it is anticipated that hydrogen would save almost twice as many greenhouse gas emissions as offshore wind between 2023 and 2032.What’s next? Thegovernment will need to think further about the business models for supporting the first commercial users of low carbon hydrogen and, in the longer term, about how to integrate hydrogen into future green gas support schemes. (The PM envisages a breakfast cooked with hydrogen, but the recent green gas levy consultation made no mention of hydrogen.) Amongst those hoping to fit in on the supply-side of the nascent UK hydrogen economy will, of course, be some of those new offshore wind farms. Green hydrogen

production can help to offset the intermittency of wind power generation and National Grid ESO’s most recent Future Energy Scenarios envisage that, at some point, some offshore wind capacity may not connect to the electricity transmission grid at all, but be focused entirely on hydrogen production. As we have written elsewhere, there are also opportunities for the North Sea oil and gas industries in this area, and some regulatory workstreams that could be started in relation to the blending of hydrogen in the gas grid (it is suggested that blending could reduce the emissions of gas used by up to 7%). Undoubtedly, a comprehensive UK hydrogen strategy (compare the Australian and German ones) would still be desirable, and one is promised for 2021, with business models finalised in 2022. It is hoped that the first GW of production capacity would be commissioned in 2025.

3. New nuclear – all shapes and sizes?

What’s the plan? It is not news that the government is keen to see new nuclear power contribute further to net zero, beyond Hinkley Point C. Another new large nuclear plant (or two), and turning the talk of small and advanced modular reactors into a production line reality, would be welcome from a jobs and a climate policy point of view. £525 million is promised for “large and smaller-scale” plants and for R&D on “new advanced modular reactors”.

What’s next? New technologies will not be ready for deployment for some time. Meanwhile, the government has to decide how to support future nuclear new build: responding to the consultation on a regulated asset base model (from July 2019) would be a good start. In due course, there will be the development consent application for Sizewell C (the “twin” of Hinkley Point C) for ministers to determine. Meanwhile, it will be interesting to see if anything comes of the suggestions that there is renewed interest in taking forward a new project at Wylfa, thought by many to be the best of the sites earmarked for new nuclear a decade ago. The Chinese state-owned nuclear developer also has plans to develop Bradwell, though there has been speculation about the geopolitics surrounding this proposal.

4. Electric vehicles: countdown to 2030

What’s the plan? For some time, it has been clear that the government’s original date of 2040 for an end to the selling of new cars and vans with internal combustion engines was insufficiently ambitious. An earlier date should save money as well as emissions. The date will now be set at 2030 (with a stay of execution for new hybrids until 2035). This is to be facilitated by £1.3 billion to speed up the roll-out of EV charging points; £582 million in grants for buying new EVs; and £500 million for “the development and mass-scale production” of EV batteries.

What’s next? The scaling-up of EVs is a multi-faceted challenge. Vehicle manufacturers and their supply chains will need to make significant investments. Petrol and diesel retailers, and those who finance the purchase of new vehicles, will need to think about developing new products that enable customers to spread the upfront cost of buying an EV over the years of running one with lower fuel costs. The Treasury will need to live with lower tax receipts from fuel duty. Electricity suppliers, local authorities, and car park owners of all sorts, will face new challenges, as well as opportunities to earn new revenues from charging EVs. Ofgem will need to think carefully about how much distribution network operators should be allowed to spend in anticipation of mass EV ownership in setting their price control for 2023-2028. And that all assumes that “EV” in this context means vehicles powered by batteries, not by hydrogen fuel cells: but if low carbon hydrogen production takes off, fuel cells may make a comeback, introducing a further element of choice and complexity. In any event, hydrogen is likely to be part of the solution to low carbon HGVs, on which a consultation is promised.

5. “Cleaner public transport”

What’s the plan? Building on “£4.2 billion in city public transport and £5 billion on buses, cycling and walking, as announced by the Prime Minister in February”, there will be “tens of billions of pounds” invested in “enhancements and renewals of the rail network” – a figure that would be significant if it does not include any of the costs of HS2. Electrification of railway lines is explicitly mentioned: it is interesting that hydrogen (an alternative mode of decarbonisation to electrification of lines) is not mentioned in connection with trains.  

What’s next? It ought to be easier to convert public transport, in the form of buses and trains, to low carbon fuel than it is to change the behaviour of millions of individual car owners. Moreover, this would help with the meeting of air quality standards. In practice, rail industry organisation and funding, in particular, were already challenging areas of policy before COVID-19 cast doubt on so many existing assumptions about their business models. However, there is no shortage of good ideas, and – other things being equal – public transport is one of the cheapest industries to convert to hydrogen use. For 2021, “the first-ever National Bus Strategy” is promised, and there is also a less specific commitment to improved rail links around “regional cities”. When it comes to cycling, at least, changes in behaviour during the time of COVID-19 may help to hit the target of doubling cycling rates from 2013 levels by 2025.

6. “Jet zero and green ships”

What’s the plan? Greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and shipping involving UK ports and airports are not currently included in the net carbon account, on the basis of which the UK’s progress towards its 2050 target is assessed – although the Committee on Climate Change has recommended that they should be. Nevertheless, they need to be addressed and, if efforts by others, including the IMO in relation to shipping, bear fruit, there will be significant opportunities for those able to supply the new fuels, ships and planes. For now, the public money going into this area seems to be relatively small amounts of research funding, rather than the £hundreds of millions or £billions seen elsewhere.

What’s next? The government set up a Jet Zero Council in July 2020. There are many promising developers of synthetic fuels that offer the prospect of aviation with fewer carbon emissions; and there is increasing interest in various alternatives to existing marine bunkers. Hydrogen and CCUS policy are likely to be key enablers of progress in this area, and it is also anticipated that “high-grade heat” from advanced modular nuclear reactors could “unlock efficient production of synthetic fuels” (and hydrogen). For 2021, consultation on an Aviation Decarbonisation Strategy and a consultation on a sustainable aviation fuels mandate (possibly to commence in 2025) are promised. These are, of course, areas where the nature of the industries mean that there are limits to what any one country can achieve on its own.

7. “Greener buildings” (£1 billion in 2021)

What’s the plan? Making buildings more energy-efficientis not particularly “exciting”, but it is a hugely important part of net zero. In particular, it makes it easier to achieve the decarbonisation of heating (because you will need less heat, low carbon or otherwise) and reduces fuel poverty. Yet it is an area where previous governments have struggled either to find ways of incentivising landlords and homeowners to take retrofitting action, or to set the bar high enough for new buildings. Set alongside a promise of £9.2 billion for energy efficiency in the last Conservative manifesto, £1 billion in 2021 looks useful rather than game-changing. Decarbonising the supply of heat is also complex: a shift from gas to hydrogen would probably involve the least inconvenience for consumers, but is some way from being

practicable. Take-up of the alternative (heat pumps) remains sluggish, but ambition is high, with a target of 600,000 per year by 2028. This is a staggering figure: it is more than 22 times the UK’s 2018 total of 27,000 installations and would be more than double what France, the current leader in European installations with very similar population size, achieved in the same year. There is no mention of additional support for the “low-hanging fruit” of low carbon heat networks, although this is an area where some progress has been made in recent years. Of all the areas on which the “ten point plan” puts a figure in terms of contribution to reducing emissions in 2023-2032, “greener buildings” scores highest (more than three times the impact of offshore wind and almost double that of hydrogen).

What’s next? In terms of “carrots” for homeowners, the government’s latest idea is the green homes grant: it is still too early to tell whether consumers and installing businesses will take full advantage of it, but it is being extended for another year. On the “stick” front, we await the outcomes of consultations on the Future Homes Standard (a consultation on an equivalent for non-domestic buildings is now promised) and a further proposed tightening of the minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES) for private rented accommodation. This is also an area where – particularly in the industrial and commercial sector – there is scope for innovative offerings from landlords and others who are prepared to invest in new technology or enter into new forms of energy efficiency as a service (EEaS) contracts. A Heat and Buildings Strategy is promised for 2021, as well as a “world class energy related products policy framework”. It will be interesting to see whether “[going] with the grain of consumer habits, [to] improve energy efficiency standards of household products” will mean setting standards that are more demanding than those set out under EU product requirements legislation, or just tracking any improvements at EU level that will no longer apply automatically in the UK after Brexit.

8. CCUS for all GB

What’s the plan? CCUS is now widely seen as pivotal to net zero ambitions. The UK has been trying to become a world leader in this area for some time, most recently by planning to support a number of CCUS industrial clusters (see our articles here and here). New elements in the “ten point plan” are a quantitative target (10MT of CO2 stored by 2030 – “equivalent to all emissions of the industrial Humber today”); an additional £200 million of (capital) funding to add to the £800 million committed by the Chancellor in the March 2020 Budget; a doubling in the ambition for the number of clusters to be established by the mid-2020s and 2030; and a new brand name for the clusters, which are now to be designated as “SuperPlaces”. We have written separately on the implications of the “ten point plan” for CCUS here.    

What’s next? Following a series of policy documents issued in August 2020, government decisions are expected on a range of details of the business models proposed for the different “links” in the CCUS value chain over the coming months. It should not be long before the government invites formal bids or expressions of interest from potential clusters. We have been following policy in this area extremely closely and advised the government on a previous attempt to commercialise CCS. Please get in touch if you have any questions.

9. Nature

What’s the plan? The “ten point plan” repeats recent announcements about the UK government’s goal of increasing to 30% the proportion of the UK covered by conservation designations; funding for “landscape recovery” projects; and investing in flood defences. What’s next? There is little in the plan about future policy development in these areas. The implementation of the Agriculture Act 2020 and the Environment Bill will play a key part. An

England Tree Strategy is promised, setting out how the Conservative manifesto commitment to plant 30,000 hectares per year will be met. There will also be a Nature Strategy.

10. Financial infrastructure

What’s the plan? Following on from earlier commitments to increase UK public spending on R&D and the publication of an R&D roadmap in July 2020, and funding for specific projects such as the STEP fusion project, the government will launch a £1 billion Net Zero Innovation Portfolio. This will focus on priority areas corresponding to the “ten point plan”: floating offshore wind; nuclear advanced modular reactors; energy storage and flexibility; bioenergy; hydrogen; homes; direct air capture and CCUS; industrial fuel switching; and “disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence for energy”.

What’s next? The UK plans to issue its first Sovereign Green Bond in 2021, “subject to market conditions”, and to introduce mandatory reporting of climate-related financial information across the economy – starting in 2023 and reaching full coverage in 2025. A “green taxonomy that defines which economic activities tackle climate change and environmental degradation” will “better guide investors”. In the short term, the government must choose between the two versions of carbon pricing that it could deploy to replace the EU Emissions Trading System from 1 January 2021 (a UK ETS or a carbon emissions tax). The outcome of Treasury’s Net Zero Review, considering “the choices across our tax, spend, regulatory and other levers to maximise growth opportunities and ensure an equitable balance of contributions across society” will be important in the longer term.

Create jobs and preserve our lifestyles

Like governments around the world, the UK government is keen to make the most of a “green recovery” from the economic turmoil caused by COVID-19. Since the “ten point plan” is as much a piece of industrial strategy as it is of energy and climate policy, it frequently reinforces the message that embracing the opportunities of net zero policies can, like the Treasury’s Freeports policy, help to “level up” areas of the country which helped the current government to its majority in the 2019 general election. Some early comments have characterised it as “more of a vision than a plan”. If so, it is a vision of a remarkably frictionless transition to net zero where nobody has to pay more for their energy; change their holiday travel habits post-pandemic; consume less red meat and dairy products; or otherwise change their behaviour (apart, perhaps, from a few of the less enthusiastic cyclists and walkers among us). One might almost caricature it as suggesting that, with a small amount of seed funding from the government, amazing new technologies will solve all our problems.

Challenges ahead

The Climate Change Act 2008 established a system of five-yearly carbon budgets to map out the trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 2050. So far, the UK has beaten the targets set for the first two budget periods and will probably beat the target for the third (2018-2022). Beyond that, it was already not on track for the fourth and fifth budget periods when the 2050 target was only for an 80%, rather than (as now) a 100% reduction from 1990 emissions levels. It is not claimed, nor is it likely to be the case, that the measures outlined in the “ten point plan” will, by themselves, close these gaps. The setting of the sixth carbon budget (for 2033-2037) is another task awaiting ministers in 2021. At a global level, it has been estimated that, on current trends, humanity will burn through the carbon budget that stands between us and dangerous climate change by 2030. There is nothing wrong with painting an attractive picture and leaving the “how” for future publications, as long as the working-out of a roadmap proceeds with a sense of urgency, a commitment to net zero objectives across government, and a willingness to make tough decisions. In the run-up to the UNFCCC CoP26 conference in Glasgow, the eyes of the world will be on UK climate and energy policy. Whilst the political heft behind the “ten point plan” is welcome, it will be the grinding detail of regulatory activity away from the limelight that will determine whether the vision becomes reality.

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UK Energy White Paper announces very busy 2021


The UK government’s Energy White Paper: Powering our net zero future, published on 14 December 2020, was long promised. Was it worth the wait? If you were expecting the sort of White Paper that sets a new strategic direction, or that describes in a lot of detail how specific policies previously only outlined will be implemented, you will be disappointed. Instead, we have a stock-take of current energy policies and a detailed agenda for what promises to be several years of significant new policy development. It is none the worse for that: the first deliverables highlighted in the White Paper appeared within days of its publication and already show progress in several areas. And what is envisaged will create new markets and may significantly reform existing ones.

The White Paper’s title echoes the 2011 Energy White Paper Planning our electric future: a white paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon energy, which set out the policies of the coalition government’s Electricity Market Reform (EMR) project. A comparison of the two documents shows both how far we have come and how much remains to be done. Huge progress has been made in decarbonising UK electricity generation, but EMR left plenty of unfinished business even there. It did not, for example, try to reform electricity markets or their institutions and governance to reflect the sector’s increasingly distributed and digitalised character or the substantial displacement of fossil fuels by less polluting technologies. Moreover, the challenge now identified by the government is both to achieve deeper decarbonisation of electricity and to go beyond electricity. EMR was able to achieve progress by incentivising actions by a relatively small number of electricity industry players. Government now wants to move forward in other areas: energy efficiency, heat, transport and industrial decarbonisation. Here, millions of consumers and businesses not focused on energy need to invest significant sums, and change their behaviour, if the UK is to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Many of them will be “encouraged” to replace fossil fuels with clean electricity, leading to a doubling of electricity demand, met by cleaner energy capacity and modernised energy markets.

The White Paper is explicitly a kind of companion piece to the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution (TPP), published less than a month ago, which summarised some of the more eye-catching aspects of the government’s energy and climate policies, and which we have written about here and here. It shares with the TPP an emphasis on how the policies it discusses, as well as contributing to net zero goals in the UK, will also promote a “green recovery” from the COVID-19 pandemic; help to “level up” economically disadvantaged parts of the UK; and demonstrate the UK’s climate leadership role (and so export opportunities) in the (extended) year of its UNFCCC CoP presidency.

We review the White Paper (and some of the follow-up to it that has already emerged) below, using the headings of its six numbered chapters. A theme across the whole White Paper is the critical need for significant change – to the behaviours of business and the public and so to the markets, policies and law needed to secure that change.

Chapter 1 – Consumers

Key messages

The White Paper aims to provide a vision of what “the transition to clean energy by 2050…will mean for [domestic or business] consumers of energy”. The policies it previews aim to ensure consumers get the benefit of new technologies (e.g. smart metering enabling time-of-use tariffs, smart charging and vehicle-to-grid), whilst addressing concerns about the competitiveness of retail energy markets and energy poverty. There is also an awareness that, by itself, technological progress and decarbonisation can cause problems, as well as solving them. For example, how should regulation address the potential impact of consumers taking advantage of the ability to generate their own renewable electricity: who pays for the grid if predominantly affluent households become more or less independent of the public energy networks in this way? More generally, there is the challenge of maintaining consumer protection as technologies and services evolve.

Chapter 1 of the White Paper is dedicated to the viewpoint of the end-users of energy, but it is reflected throughout the document. As it says: “The way that…costs are passed through to bills can incentivise or disincentivise certain types of consumer behaviour”. The challenge is that, so far, millions of domestic electricity and gas customers ignore the existing, basic price signals in the market. Over 50% are on default tariffs, even though almost all know they can switch, and many more or less consciously pay a “loyalty penalty” for not doing so. Will those of us who are still only passive participants in the market be prompted to change our attitude by the prospect of being able to make further savings or gains by running washing machines and charging EVs when wholesale power prices are low, or of charging an extra household battery when they are negative? The answer may be “yes” if a significantly greater share of the home wallet is spent on electricity (because the home EV charging station will replace the petrol station and an electric heating system will replace gas) but the White Paper also hints that regulation may compel as well as incentivise.

Policy pipeline

In “early” or “spring” 2021, the White Paper promises the following.

  • Conclusion of the HM Treasury review on funding the transition to net zero (which began in 2019, at the prompting of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC)). An interim report from the review emerged within a few days of the White Paper’s publication. It contains some useful economic information and analysis, but its conclusions so far are anodyne (samples: “The costs of the transition to net zero are uncertain and depend on policy choices”; “Households are exposed to the transition through their consumption, labour market participation and asset holdings”). Unless we have missed something, there is no hint here of, for example, a decisive shift in carbon taxation, or a move away from subsidising clean energy on the proceeds of consumer levies that are arguably inherently regressive. However, this is essentially an exercise in setting the background to policy, rather than policy itself, and perhaps we should not rush to judgment until the final report emerges.
  • “A call for evidence [by April 2021] to begin a strategic dialogue between government, consumers and industry on affordability and fairness” including the distribution of net zero costs (demographically and, for example, as between gas and electricity consumers).
  • A final decision from Ofgem (spring 2021) on when and how to implement the proposals for market-wide half hourly settlement in the electricity market, which have been gestating for years.
  • Consultations on opt-in switching (to be implemented by 2024) and on how auto-renewal and roll-over tariff arrangements can be reformed (March 2021).
  • A consultation on reforms to ensure consumers have transparent information about things like the carbon content of the energy supplied to them.
  • A consultation on retail market reform, e.g. about regulating intermediaries such as energy brokers and price comparison websites (spring 2021).

We are also promised action in other areas – either in 2021 generally, or without an explicit indication of timing, but in a context that suggests that next steps will or may be taken at some point next year.

  • A consultation on the expansion and terms of the Energy Company Obligation and Warm Home Discount schemes (ECO and WHD) that respectively aim to improve the energy efficiency of the homes, and provide a cash discount on the bills, of poorer customers. ECO and WHD obligations fall on energy suppliers in the first instance, but only if they have more than 250,000 customers. This helps small suppliers, but creates a number of market distortions: how can these best be removed?
  • It is three years since Ofgem’s then CEO asked “Do the ‘supplier hub’ market rules need reform?”. The White Paper is guarded about the need for “market framework changes…to facilitate the development and uptake of innovative tariffs and products that work for consumers and contribute to net zero”. There will be engagement with industry and consumer groups throughout 2021 before a formal consultation, as the government assesses “whether incremental changes…are sufficient or whether more fundamental changes are required”.
  • Data is key to empowering consumers and developing innovative energy business models that can improve their experience, offer them more choice and benefit them financially. In the standard phrase used where primary legislation may be required to introduce new policies, the government is planning to “legislate when Parliamentary time allows” on smart appliances, to address issues of interoperability, data privacy and cyber security. Such provisions could presumably be part of a Bill focused on either “digital” or “energy” issues. No doubt 2021 will also see more outputs from the Modernising Energy Data programme.

Chapter 2 – Power

Key messages

Power (generation) is the area where most decarbonisation has been achieved already, and where the government’s most notable goals and commitments (like 40GW of offshore wind, including 1GW floating, by 2030, and £160 million of investment in manufacturing facilities) have already been extensively aired in the TPP and elsewhere. The White Paper paints the big picture clearly enough: electricity could provide more than half of final energy demand in 2050, up from 17% in 2019. This would require a four-fold increase in clean electricity generation. However, ministers will not determine the precise generation mix and the commitment to market mechanisms remains.

Note – “clean”, and not just green. For more flexible low carbon generation, the government is keen to develop gas-fired power with CCUS (or hydrogen) as part of its industrial cluster SuperPlaces; for low carbon baseload, nuclear remains a major focus of immediate investment and technology development. A few hours before publishing the White Paper, it confirmed its decision to begin negotiations with EDF (and its Chinese state-owned partner) about the proposed Sizewell C nuclear plant. There are significant funding programmes for small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMR), and support for nuclear fusion. These are expected to bear fruit in the 2030s and beyond. In the meantime, there is a target to “bring at least one large-scale nuclear project to the point of FID by the end of this Parliament, subject to clear value for money and all relevant approvals”. The White Paper announces a degree of progress towards a new regulatory and funding framework for public funding and regulation of new-build nuclear (see below), including potential capital support for construction, though it leaves options previously canvassed open.

Though there are no new, immediate funding announcements for them, there is encouragement for investors in battery and long-term storage, demand response technologies and interconnectors, which the government says it expects to form key parts of the (predominantly wind and solar) generation mix, alongside the other clean technologies discussed elsewhere in this note. Less so for wave and tidal technologies, which are to be studied further as evidence about them emerges.

For fossil-fuel plant operators, the day on which the White Paper was published also brought clarity in the form of an announcement confirming that the UK would replace the portion of its carbon pricing regime that has hitherto been provided by the “cap and trade” EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) with a UK ETS, rather than the alternative mechanism of a Carbon Emissions Tax (see Chapter 5 below).

Policy pipeline

On the agenda for 2021 are:

  • opening to SMRs the nuclear Generic Design Assessment process for assessing the safety, security and environmental implications of new nuclear reactor designs;
  • more development of the CfD support framework for renewables. A number of changes to the regime have already been announced or are being consulted on in the context of the fourth CfD Allocation Round (AR4), which is due in “late 2021”, including requiring adherence to developers’ supply chain plans, aimed to deliver 60% UK content in offshore wind by 2030. At the same time, the White Paper confirms this as the primary instrument for public funding of new and existing renewable generation technologies, until these can operate without subsidy, with auctions every two years with increasing scale confirmed. Government is looking beyond AR4 and considering how to maintain growth in renewable deployment while ensuring overall system costs for electricity consumers are minimised and innovative technologies and business models are supported. To this end, it has published Enabling a high renewable, net zero electricity system: call for evidence. The 22 questions in this document cover a wide range of topics: everything from the impact on cost of capital of introducing greater exposure to the market price for power, to the accommodation of hybrid and international projects in the CfD regime, to the interface of the CfD regime and Ofgem’s Access and Forward-Looking Charges Review and the Balancing Services Charges Task Force. This is an extremely important publication that all stakeholders in the GB renewables sector would do well to engage with seriously (the call for evidence runs until 22 February 2021). It seems highly likely that further consultations will follow during 2021 or early in 2022;
  • a call for evidence on the role of biomass in net zero power: in particular, by 2022, it will be established what role biomass with CCS (BECCS) can play in reducing carbon emissions and how it could be deployed (as part of a wider biomass strategy taking account, as biomass policy always must, of how sustainable the use of biomass for energy purposes is). If nothing else, this may be an important part of the evaluation of any bid for CCUS funding that includes the large biomass units at Drax, whose current revenue support expires before 2030. A wider call for evidence on greenhouse gas removal technologies (which includes BECCS, but also Direct Air CCS (DACCS) and others) is currently open;
  • a review of the national (planning) policy statements (NPSs) that provide the policy background for development consents for major new energy infrastructure in England and Wales, with fresh NPSs to be designated by the end of the year. Depending on how far work on this has already progressed, this is not an unambitious target, given the requirements for statutory consultation, appraisal of sustainability and Parliamentary approval before designation. Since the NPSs were originally designated, new technologies, not dealt with in the current versions, have (or will soon have) crossed the 50MW threshold from which they apply, including solar, various forms of storage and floating offshore wind;
  • large-scale gas-fired power – an area where there is likely to be lively debate on the NPSs. In the last decade, much of this has been consented, but almost none built. The prospect of support being available for plants with CCUS raises obvious questions about the existing NPS policies in this area. Should revised NPSs seek to restrict new consents for gas-fired projects to sites with credible links to proposed CCUS clusters? The typical instinct of UK energy infrastructure policy-makers is never to prescribe more than they feel they absolutely have to. Meanwhile, the White Paper promises a consultation in early 2021 on ways to remove the requirement for proposed new combustion plant with a capacity of 300MW or more to be consented only if it is considered technically and economically feasible to retrofit CCS to it within its operational life. Given the range of projects that have been deemed to satisfy this criterion, it may be doubted whether it has in practice been that onerous, but it is, of course, true that there are likely to be more ways for a CCGT plant to become CO2 emission-free in the future than retrofitting CCS – for example, by converting to run on hydrogen (which need not necessarily be produced in a CCUS cluster: it could, for example, be produced by the electrolysis of water using electricity generated from renewable, or even nuclear, sources);
  • CHP – shortly before the White Paper was published, the government released a summary of responses to Combined Heat and Power (CHP): the route to 2050 – call for evidence. A more detailed consultation on CHP issues is to follow in 2021;
  • assessment of the synergies between offshore wind and hydrogen production; and
  • establishment of a “Ministerial Delivery Group” to ensure joined up government.

Supporting analysis/other documents published with the White Paper

The White Paper was published alongside a number of other documents, many of which relate to aspects of power generation policy.

  • In July 2019, the government consulted on a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model for nuclear. It was thought that a RAB model with some of the characteristics of the funding and support package for the Thames Tideway Tunnel would reduce the cost of capital for future new nuclear projects, making them cheaper than the funding and support package for Hinkley Point C. What we have now is not an elaboration of the elements of a proposed nuclear RAB regime, but a summary of the responses to the July 2019 consultation with some very brief conclusions, such as that “if any model is to attract private financing”, it will require a variable £/MWh price, “allowing for the revenue stream to be adjusted by the Regulator as circumstances change”; allowed revenue during construction “to reduce the scale and capital cost of financing” and reduce total costs; and “some level of risk sharing between investor and consumers/taxpayers”. It sounds as if government will develop policy in the course of its negotiations with EDF and the promoters of other large nuclear projects still going forward.
  • The White Paper states the familiar adage: “The electricity market should determine the best solutions for very low emissions and reliable supply, at a low cost to consumers”. Since “the electricity market” is largely the product of policy and regulatory choices, that comment only takes us so far. However, the government has been refining the modelling that is used to look at illustrative mixes of generation compatible with net zero. Some show two to three times as much nuclear as now, and half to a third as much gas-fired generation, but with CCUS. In all, 7,000 different mixes have been modelled, for two different levels of demand and flexibility and 27 different technology cost combinations, giving more than 700,000 unique scenarios. The accompanying Modelling 2050 – electricity system analysis paper concludes that there is no single optimal mix; that system costs are lowest when carbon intensity is 5-25gCO2/kWh; that there is some substitutability between hydrogen-fired generation and long-term storage on the one hand and nuclear and gas with CCUS on the other; and that more analysis is needed.
  • In 2016, the government consulted on proposals to legislate for the phasing out of coal-fired generation in GB. These have yet to be implemented, but now it has issued a further consultation on Early phase-out of unabated coal generation in Great Britain – the idea now being to ban coal-fired generation from 1 October 2024, rather than 1 October 2025. In the meantime, more coal-fired plant has closed; the amount of capacity with obligations under the Capacity Market has fallen from 10.5GW in the 2017/18 delivery year to 1.3GW in the T-4 auction for delivery in 2023/24; and 2019 has set new records for the number of days that have passed without coal-fired power being exported onto the network. Realistically, with coal unable to compete for Capacity Market payments after 1 October 2024, it may be unlikely that the remaining units would stay operational after that date in any event, but it makes sense to tie up this loose end of policy and secure a potential additional decarbonisation advantage.

Post-White Paper update

  • When the government responded to the July 2019 consultation on CCUS business models in August 2020, it did not provide a great deal of new detail on its evolving thinking. In our own analysis of the 2019 consultation prior to the August 2020 response, we identified 63 questions (many of them with several parts) that government needed to answer in order to move forward with its ambitions for (then) two and (now) four CCUS clusters in the next decade. The August 2020 documents left many of these questions unanswered. We have not yet carried out an exact tally, but it is clear that the update on CCUS business models published on 21 December 2020 has now answered many more of them.
  • The policy on CCUS power, in particular, has advanced considerably. Accompanying the general update document, Chapter 4 of which focuses on power, are a “detailed explanation” and a 111-page “heads of terms” relating to the Dispatchable Power Agreement (DPA) that will channel consumer-funded support to CCUS power stations in the form of Availability Payments and Variable Payments. Together, the documents make it a lot clearer in what respects the DPA terms will follow the pattern of EMR CfDs, and what their provisions will look like where they depart from the CfD model. Most of the “detailed explanation” document is taken up with about 20 pages explaining how the payment mechanisms are expected to work (also making clear the points on which decisions have yet to be made). There are formulae, with several pages defining the terms used in them. This is real progress, though the devil will be in the detail.
  • The material on CCUS power is complemented by Chapter 3 of the update, on the transport and storage (T&S) elements of CCUS, on whose effective functioning everything else in the CCUS value chain ultimately depends. T&S is also the subject of two annexes to the update, setting out “draft commercial principles” for, respectively, a T&S licence and a government support package for T&S. There is less detail here than in the power documents, but it is becoming clearer how the “high impact, low probability” risks associated with T&S will be addressed, even if “the ownership model of the T&SCo” remains under consideration.
  • There is not space here to do justice to the 21 December 2020 CCUS publications. We will comment on them further elsewhere. If you have questions about them, please get in touch.

Chapter 3 – Energy system

Key messages

The energy system chapter of the White Paper is about the physical (gas and electricity) infrastructures that connect energy supply and demand, and about the regulatory frameworks that govern the sector. Three quotes will give a flavour: “The prize is an energy system which is not only cleaner but also smarter”; the plan to “drive competition deep[er] into the operation of our energy markets”; and “Separate networks for electricity, gas for heating and petrol or diesel for cars and vans…will increasingly merge into one system, as electricity becomes the common energy currency”. As the chapter points out, further physical and regulatory adaptation will be needed for hydrogen and CCUS.

The subject matter of this chapter is extremely important but it can sometimes seem a little disparate and the lines of future policy are not always easy to discern from it.

On the gas side, there is talk of reviewing “the overarching regulatory framework set out in the Gas Act 1995”, removing distortions in the existing regulatory structure and allowing competition with lower carbon options while maintaining security of supply. A little later, we find:

We need the operation of national and local energy markets to be managed impartially, without conflict of interest, ensuring they are fully open to competition. We need a robust process for setting and enforcing system rules, an approach which ensures that the rules promote competition and innovation, not act as a barrier to change. There is also a need for a greater co-ordination to drive collaboration between different parts of the energy system which are currently too siloed.

We need to consider, at both the transmission and distribution level, whether the roles which discharge these functions are undertaken by government, Ofgem, industry parties such as the system operator, or by an entirely new body. We will review the right long-term role and organisational structure for the ESO, in light of the reforms to the system operator instituted in April 2019. It is possible that there will need to be greater independence from the current ownership structure, should it be appropriate to confer additional roles on the system operator.

These new roles should help the system achieve our net zero ambitions and meet consumers’ needs. Without them, we risk having an energy system which makes less effective investment and operational decisions, resulting in excessive costs for consumers or a failure to reduce emissions in line with our net zero target.

This sounds potentially quite radical. It echoes the statement in the National Infrastructure Strategy (NIS), published in November 2020: “The government will review the right long-term role and organisational structure for the Electricity System Operator”, and that “greater independence from the current ownership structure” may be required if “additional roles” are conferred on the System Operator. At a similarly fundamental level, the NIS also committed the government to producing “an overarching policy paper on economic regulation” in 2021 (see further below). It is clear that (possibly complete) separation of ownership and operation of the electricity system operator is on the agenda; the separation of the two functions, rather than a simpler nationalisation or ownership divestment requirement, presumably seeks to avoid the need to buy out existing system operator shareholders, who will retain the ownership function.

There is a commitment to “support the rollout of charging and associated grid infrastructure along the strategic road network, to support drivers to make the switch to EVs…”

Policy pipeline

A busy 2021 beckons for regulatory developments in relation to energy systems.

  • The review of the gas legislation referred to above, with industry workshops throughout 2021.
  • The government claims to have implemented two-thirds of the policies in the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan that it published with Ofgem in 2017, and to be “on track to deliver it in full by 2022, removing barriers to energy storage, enabling smart homes and businesses and properly rewarding providers of flexibility services”. However, there is more to be done: “We are now ready to take the next step in driving flexibility deep into the energy system”, and a new Smart Systems Plan will be issued in spring 2021.
  • Regulations are to be made under the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 to mandate that private EV chargepoints must be capable of delivering smart charging.
  • There is a promise to define electricity storage in legislation when Parliamentary time allows, although it is not clear whether or how it is proposed to change the regulatory treatment of storage (beyond existing initiatives) once it has been defined. In the shorter term, there is to be a major competition to accelerate commercialisation of first of a kind, longer duration energy storage. This will be focused on non-proven storage technologies.
  • Another topic on which legislation is promised when Parliamentary time allows (and not for the first time) is enabling competitive tendering for, and building, ownership and operation of, the onshore electricity networks (transmission and distribution). Draft clauses on this were published and considered by a Parliamentary committee four years ago, and Ofgem did a considerable amount of work on what was referred to at the time as the CATO regime – aiming to bring some of the benefits of the offshore, OFTO regime to the onshore networks. Although hampered by the lack of Parliamentary follow-through on the required primary legislation, the project also seemed to lack early projects (other than connections to new nuclear power stations) on which to be showcased. Maybe it will be different this time, particularly if government is moving to separate (further) the system operation and network operation/ownership functions or arms of transmission and distribution groups.
  • There is also a linkage with the perception that changes in technology mean that the answer to “network problems” today is not necessarily more traditional network infrastructure, whose value will be added to a network operator’s RAB. It may instead be infrastructure that is inherently more flexible, storage (which is treated as generation and therefore not generally to be owned by the networks) or a pure IT solution of some kind (i.e. not a physical asset at all). The possibility of “system operators” being independent commissioners of solutions from a range of providers/infrastructure owners begins to take shape. The White Paper notes that DNOs have already entered into contracts for 1.2GW of flexibility in 2020 without even having an explicitly recognised system operator function. It suggests that the network innovation funding awarded by Ofgem, which is currently part of the regulatory framework for licensed operators, could be opened up to a wider range of participants. The government wants to encourage more local solutions and open up as many services as possible to competition.
  • Just as onshore networks seek to apply some of the learning of OFTOs, so the government and Ofgem are looking at ways that a more co-ordinated, and therefore perhaps onshore-like, approach could be taken to the development of offshore transmission, as the offshore wind sector is scheduled for enormous growth over the next 10 years. Some output from the current review process is to be expected in 2021, but a full picture will take time to emerge. Indeed, the White Paper seems to suggest that any more radical reshaping of an “offshore grid” may not happen until the 2030s. Although offshore wind projects in development are invited to express an interest in being “pathfinders”, it would perhaps inject too much uncertainty into forthcoming CfD auctions to implement fundamental change earlier.
  • On 16 December 2020, National Grid ESO published a Phase 1 report from its offshore coordination project. This highlights the potential benefits of taking an “integrated approach” to the offshore network sooner (from 2025) rather than later (from 2030), including savings of £6 billion (or 18%), rather than £3 billion (or 8%), for consumers to 2050, and reduced amounts of infrastructure (adding further social and environmental benefits). What does an integrated approach mean? It does not sound like rocket science – for example: considering connection options other than point-to-point offshore network connections, such as multi-terminal meshed HVDC and HVAC options, or considering the onshore system as part of offshore development, rather than looking at onshore and offshore network designs separately. The possible results (by 2030) of going for earlier integration, as shown in Figure 2 (page 19) of the report, make for a strikingly less cluttered map. NG ESO identifies a number of regulatory changes that would be required to enable earlier integration and make recommendations to the offshore transmission review. A Phase 2 report will be issued in 2021.
  • One area in which there may be an early chance to explore new approaches to offshore transmission, particularly given the provisions on UK-EU cooperation in renewable energy contained in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement announced on 24 December 2020, is hybrid projects involving both export from an offshore wind farm and an interconnector, possibly with the Netherlands. Notwithstanding Brexit, there is enthusiasm for more interconnectors in the White Paper – potentially 18GW of interconnector capacity by 2030 (three times current levels). Alongside the White Paper, the results of a study by Aurora Energy Research are published. They find that “an increase in interconnector capacity between GB and EU would likely lead to: a decrease in emissions in GB and EU; a reduction in total power market cost in GB, as baseload prices in GB decrease; less thermal generation in GB, with little change in thermal generation in the EU; and less curtailment of renewable energy sources (RES) technologies”. What’s not to like? Of course, at present, Ofgem has more influence than ministers in determining whether new interconnector schemes go ahead, through the “cap and floor” funding regime. The White Paper does not suggest any specific policy initiative on interconnectors beyond exploration of hybrid links.
  • In keeping with the paragraphs quoted above suggesting potentially significant changes in the regulatory architecture, the White Paper promises for spring 2021 a Smart Systems Plan and consultation on ensuring that “institutional arrangements governing the energy system are fit for purpose for the long term” and a dialogue on “the future of gas as we transition to a clean energy system”. Another idea that has been dormant for a while has reappeared in the promise to consult on a Strategy and Policy Statement (SPS) for Ofgem – a strategic steer to the independent regulator from ministers that was legislated for in 2013, with a draft SPS consulted on five years ago. It will be interesting to see how much government thinking has changed in this area.
  • Modern energy systems are at least as much about data as pipes and wires. An energy data and digitalisation strategy is promised for spring 2021. Later in the year, the prototype of a national energy data catalogue will be launched, and Ofgem will consult on guidance about appropriate sharing of data by market participants, and associated licence conditions.
  • The scheduled review of the Capacity Market in 2024 is also confirmed.

Supporting analysis/other documents published with the White Paper

Three important system-related documents are published alongside the White Paper.

  • Some may find that the title Electrical engineering standards: independent review suggests content that is not the most exciting in this suite of publications. They would be wrong. This has turned out to be a very wide-ranging piece of work. It concludes that there is a need to rethink some of the most basic propositions underlying the current electricity system. These reflect the one-size-fits-all, top-down approach of a nationalised industry, where electricity was used in more homogeneous ways than it is today, and consumers were purely passive. A lot has changed in 80 years, but rules on voltage limits or assumptions about the value of lost load have not kept pace with shifts in technology and consumer behaviour. The recommendations of the panel conducting the review include reframing the system of standards around what customers can expect from the system, and what they are expected to provide in return. For example, would you be prepared to pay less for a network connection if you have a battery that can keep your lights on if it suits the system operator to interrupt your supply from the grid? How far does it make sense to oversize new network connections, given possible changes in electricity use in a net zero world? This is a huge area, and there is significant money at stake. The review quotes studies that have found that reforming standards could generate savings of £2-6 billion annually and £5-10 billion on a one-off basis.
  • The summary of responses to the July 2019 consultation on Reforming the energy industry codes does not give away much in terms of government thinking on the subject. As the White Paper says: “We will consider the best future framework for energy codes and consult on options for reform in 2021, building on the government and Ofgem’s joint review of code governance and the work of the independent panel on engineering standards.” As the summary of responses puts it: “We are…aware that reforms to code governance interact with wider questions of system governance, including the current split of responsibilities across Ofgem, the system operator and government. Government are currently undertaking thinking in this area…To achieve the aims set out in last year’s consultation we expect that implementation of reforms will take a number of years, and that the delivery of some elements may need to be staged”. In other words, this is important stuff; do not hold your breath.
  • In a Letter to Ofgem on RIIO-ED2 related energy policies (sent in October 2020, but only published now), Energy Minister Kwasi Kwarteng sets out some “observations” for the benefit of Ofgem as it moves forward with the RIIO-ED2 price control for electricity distribution network operators. This carefully drafted document has to navigate both the fact that government thinking in a number of the areas discussed appears to be still at a formative stage and the need not to trespass on Ofgem’s independence. Amongst other things, it encourages Ofgem to draw “clear distinctions between network operation and system operation activities” without excluding “any particular future institutional model”; and to adopt a “touch the network once” approach to investment wherever possible. There will no doubt be plenty of argument with the DNOs during the price control review process about the extent to which paying for investment in anticipation of, for example, projected take-up of EVs is justified, regardless of whether it is believed (or has been stated) that government would prefer to see formal separation of system operator and network operation at distribution level (mirroring or going beyond what the creation of NG ESO has achieved at transmission level).

Transport

Transport accounts for a quarter of UK greenhouse gas emissions, with more than 90% of it from road use. The White Paper does not give transport a chapter of its own: instead, it gets a section at the end of the Energy Systems chapter. Alongside reminders of points already set out in the TPP, such as support for clean buses and EV charging infrastructure, the main message is that a Department for Transport, Transport Decarbonisation Plan (TDP) will appear in spring 2021.

The TDP will focus on six strategic priorities: accelerating modal shift to “public transport and active travel [cycling and walking)]”; looking at “place-based solutions” to the problem of high emissions; decarbonising logistics (a timely emphasis for those of us worried about the carbon footprint of our online shopping habits); decarbonising vehicles; the UK as a hub for green transport technology and innovation; and action on the international front.

There will be a consultation in 2021 on fleshing out the plans, already announced, to end sales of new petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2030, while the sale of cars and vans “that emit from the tailpipe [but] have significant zero emission capability” continues until 2035.

Chapter 4 – Buildings

Key messages

There is competition for the title of Cinderella of energy policy, but the area of “buildings” has a fair claim. Will it be going to the Ball any time soon?

As the White Paper reminds us, the UK’s buildings are its second largest source of greenhouse gas emissions (behind transport, and just ahead of industry). This is not surprising, as 90% use fossil fuels for heating, cooking and hot water, and 66% of homes have an energy performance certificate rating of D or worse (the residential sector accounts for more than three-quarters of emissions from buildings). The government wants “as many [homes] as possible” to be rated C or better by 2035, as part of a drive to reduce building emissions five times as much by 2050 as we have since 1990.

Existing initiatives, such as ECO and WHD, which are being extended to 2026, with additional funding, will play an important part. A Future Homes Standard will apply to new-build properties, ensuring that they have 75 to 80% lower emissions and are “zero-carbon ready”. In the meantime, there is to be an “interim uplift in standards” to reduce emissions by 31%. Alongside greater energy efficiency both in new buildings and applied through retrofitting, heating needs to be decarbonised. There is no single technology alternative to gas boilers: heat pumps, hydrogen and green gas are all in the mix. In introducing new technology, the aim will be to “target the point of least disruption to consumers and minimise the impact on the housing market and therefore look to use natural trigger points, such as the replacement cycle for existing heating systems”. As a start, the government has already introduced the Green Homes Grant scheme for home energy improvements in England.

Policy pipeline

There is a long list of items on the agenda for 2021. We have tried to group them thematically below.

  • Strategies:A Heat and Buildings Strategy will set out “ambitious plans in further detail, including the suite of policy levers that we will use to encourage consumers and businesses to make the transition [to low carbon heat]”. “Early” or “spring” 2021 will also see the launches of an Updated Fuel Poverty Strategy for England; a “world-class energy-related products policy”; and a green jobs taskforce (to green and manage the transition for those working in high carbon industries).
  • Energy efficiency: There will be a consultation on a performance-based rating scheme for large commercial and industrial buildings. The government will also consult on a scheme to facilitate the installation of efficiency measures by small businesses, either through an auction process or an energy efficiency obligation. There will also be consultation on strengthening the existing ESOS regime, based on options identified in the post-implementation review of that scheme. If changes are needed to the Energy Performance of Buildings (England and Wales) Regulations 2012, as they may be, the power under which those regulations were made is no longer available after the end of the Brexit transition period, and the government will have to wait until Parliamentary time allows for new enabling legislation to be made.
  • More consultations:Significant consumer expenditure on home energy improvements that is not covered by regulated support schemes is likely in many cases to be financed by borrowing, as part of existing mortgage arrangements. There will be a consultation on how mortgage lenders could support homeowners in improving the energy performance of their homes. Consultations will take place on regulations to phase out fossil fuels in off-grid buildings, and on whether it is appropriate to end gas grid connections to new homes built from 2025. As well as responding to the April 2020 consultation on proposals for a Clean Heat Grant to support heat pump installation, the government will consult on ways of supporting the development of the UK heat pump market, including voluntary uptake by consumers in on-grid homes.
  • Responses to consultations:Responses are promised to the April 2020 proposals for a Clean Heat Grant and a green gas support scheme, which is scheduled to launch in autumn 2021. The aim is to reach treble 2018 levels of biomethane injection into the gas grid by 2030.
  • Hydrogen and green gas: Building on existing trials of hydrogen in the context of domestic heating and other applications, there will be a neighbourhood level trial by 2023 and a “hydrogen village” by 2025. Strategic decisions about the long-term role of hydrogen in heating should be addressed in the mid-2020s and a “hydrogen town” be seen by the end of 2020. There will be a call for evidence on hydrogen-ready appliances during 2021, and steps will be taken to enable blending of up to 20% hydrogen in the gas grid – which has already been demonstrated to be technically feasible – by 2023, subject to further trials.
  • Heat networks:Converting homes and businesses to low carbon forms of heating is easier if they are supplied by a heat network, rather than all having their own gas-fired boilers. Installing a network also enables other energy efficiency savings to be made. The government has encouraged heat networks through the Heat Networks Investment Project and proposes to continue to do so through the Green Heat Networks Fund. However, there is a consensus that, in order to reach their full potential, heat networks need their own scheme of regulation. The government consulted on this in February 2020 and now proposes to legislate on it “in this Parliament”, as well as taking powers to reduce the reliance of existing heat networks on gas as a fuel. The Scottish Government has already introduced its own legislative proposals (on somewhat different principles) in this area. There will be a consultation on heat network zoning (in England and Wales), with the aim that local authorities should designate heat network zones by 2025.
  • Innovation:The government will explore options for enabling permanent electricity demand reduction to be a viable alternative to building more generation or network capacity. This could involve thermal, hot water or battery storage, possibly combined with time of use tariffs.

Supporting analysis/other documents published with the White Paper

In commenting on the TPP, we noted that the government envisages increasing heat pump installation rates in the UK by a factor of 20. Alongside the White Paper, it published the results of a Heat pump manufacturing supply chain research project, which investigated the supply chain aspects of increased UK use of heat pumps. In particular, this looked at the potential to convert additional heat pump demand into more jobs in the UK heat pump manufacturing sector – some of them potentially replacing jobs that may be lost when gas boilers are no longer installed in new homes (from 2025).

Chapter 5 – Industrial energy

Key messages

The centrepiece of the government’s industrial decarbonisation strategy is CCUS. The TPP signalled an increase in ambition for supporting CCUS clusters from two to four by 2030. The White Paper additionally refers to “at least one fully net zero cluster by 2040”. Hydrogen is also seen as playing a key part, and the White Paper mentions the target of 5GW of low carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030 and the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund (“£240 million of capital co-investment out to 2024/25”) that were set out in the TPP. Elsewhere, the White Paper indicates that the government is interested in encouraging more forms of low carbon hydrogen production than what are usually referred to as “blue” (methane reforming with CCUS) and “green” (renewable electricity electrolysing water) hydrogen – for example, biomass gasification and use of nuclear power.

Any serious support framework for industrial CCUS or low carbon hydrogen projects needs at least to take into account applicable carbon pricing regimes. The higher carbon prices are, the smaller the subsidy, in principle, that users of CCUS facilities or low carbon hydrogen require, because high carbon alternatives will have become more expensive. Indeed, the value of avoided emissions, based on carbon pricing, is likely to be a key component in calculating CCUS and hydrogen subsidy payments. Confirmation that a UK ETS will take effect from 1 January 2021 in GB is therefore welcome (Northern Ireland remains subject to the EU ETS under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement).

The UK ETS has already been the subject of consultation. It is very similar to the EU ETS that it replaces, except in its insularity, although the UK remains “open to linking the UK ETS internationally”. An Auction Reserve Price is included to provide a price floor when emitters bid for the allowances that those covered by the scheme need in order to be permitted to emit greenhouse gases. In principle, by making use of this and other features of the scheme, it may be possible for it to provide a more certain trajectory of future carbon prices than the EU ETS has sometimes done in the past.

However, neither the EU ETS nor the UK ETS will stand still in the next few years. For example, the scope of both schemes is likely to be expanded to cover businesses and sectors that are currently outside it. The government is also interested in exploring the possibility of using the UK ETS to incentivise the deployment of greenhouse gas removal technologies.

Policy pipeline

The policy agenda set for 2021 is as follows (in the order suggested by the White Paper):

  • publication of a hydrogen strategy (Scotland has stolen a march on the UK here);
  • publication of an Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy (spring 2021);
  • consultation on a preferred business model for low carbon hydrogen in 2021, introducing a  commercial framework by 2022;
  • publication of further details on revenue mechanisms for CCUS, to be finalised by 2022.

Other documents published with the White Paper/immediate follow-up Alongside the White Paper, the government published a summary of responses to its August 2019 Creating a Clean Steel Fund: call for evidence. This document reflects both the importance, and some of the complexities, of decarbonising the steel sector. A few days later, the CCUS update offered some insights into the government’s evolving thinking on CCUS for industrial emitters (a subject that we had previously discussed in a November 2020 article). Perhaps inevitably, this is less developed than the business model for CCUS power discussed above. However, chapter 5 of the main update document and its Annex E give us more information than we had already about the central payment mechanism and contract structure for supporting industrial CCUS (drawing again on the existing EMR CfD model), as well as other key features such as eligibility, metering and risk allocation.

Chapter 6 – Oil and gas

Key messages

The UK’s oil and gas sector, centred on the North Sea, has a key part to play in the Energy Transition. The sector’s upstream regulator, the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) has been emphasising the “net zero” agenda for some time, and there has been no shortage of recent studies of the potential for integrating the North Sea’s “old energy” economy of oil and gas extraction with its “new energy” economies of offshore wind, CCUS and low carbon hydrogen.

The question is what it does or should mean for the North Sea to be “net zero” by 2050 (an aim previously stated by the OGA and repeated by the White Paper). Depending on how it is defined, this could be a much harder goal to grasp or achieve than, say, decarbonising the UK power sector – given the range of emissions impacts of the oil and gas industry (both in its own activities, and upstream and downstream of those).

The OGA consulted in May 2020 on proposed revisions to its governing Strategy that are designed to ensure that the oil and gas industry facilitates the new technologies and does its best to reduce emissions produced by venting, flaring and the supply of power from on-platform combustion units. We have written about this elsewhere (see here, here, here, here, here and here).

Earlier in December 2020, Denmark announced its intention not to issue any more upstream licences, and to aim to end all existing production in its part of the North Sea by 2050. The UK’s vision remains different. The White Paper indicates that, while a return to “business as usual” after the COVID-19 emergency is not an option, ensuring that the UK remains an attractive destination for global capital is seen as the best way to secure an orderly and successful transition away from traditional fossil fuels.

However, there will be a review of policy on future upstream licensing, seeking to ensure its compatibility with net zero. This is presented as an “opportunity for the UK to demonstrate that effective climate leadership can be compatible with maintaining a strong economy and robust energy security”.  It may involve “seeking independent advice on how proceeding with future licensing would impact our climate and energy goals”.

Meanwhile, the UK will join the World Bank’s “zero flaring by 2030” initiative. The OGA will benchmark greenhouse gas emissions to drive performance and create a new asset stewardship expectation for net zero. It will update its guidance and economic assessments to include full carbon costs. The government will tackle regulatory and policy barriers to the use of clean electricity on platforms. It will challenge industry players to address embodied “Scope 3” emissions both upstream (in its own supply chains) and downstream (among those who use its products) of their own activities. Future government support will depend on the sector adopting “meaningful measures which reduce emissions and report[ing] transparently on progress, for example through adhering to the recommendations of the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure”.

On the decommissioning side, the White Paper signals an intention to work with industry and regulators on regulations for re-purposing assets and to develop technical guidance on how to do this safely and securely. There is to be a review of the decommissioning regulatory unit OPRED to ensure that it is fully equipped to drive up environmental standards.

The White Paper sets out the UK’s new policy, announced a few days before its publication, of no new direct financial or promotional support for the fossil fuel energy sector overseas. There are to be some “tightly bound” exemptions for activities that support health, safety and environmental improvements; form part of wider clean energy transitions; support decommissioning or are associated with a humanitarian response.

Policy pipeline

The agenda set out for 2021 is as follows:

  • conclusions on the licensing regime will be published;
  • a North Sea Transition Deal will deliver “new business opportunities, jobs and skills [in] the sector [and] protect the wider communities which rely on the oil and gas sector”;
  • a draft Downstream Oil Resilience Bill will be published, with a view to ensuring “a secure and resilient supply of fossil fuels during the transition to net zero emissions”;
  • there will be a consultation on the use of fuels from non-biogenic waste (such as non-recyclable plastics).

Other documents published with the White Paper/immediate follow-up

Alongside the White Paper, the government published a response to Strengthening the UK’s offshore oil and gas decommissioning industry: call for evidence. The focus here is on improving the competitiveness of the UK’s decommissioning sector, and increasing its export business. There is an emphasis on visibility of the pipeline of projects and benchmarking. Stakeholders pointed out the lack of UK heavy lifting vessels and ultra-deep-water ports, but are said to have urged the government to avoid forms of intervention that could result in marked distortions. Some useful next steps are noted.

Two days after the White Paper was published, the first policy deliverable it identified in the oil and gas space was delivered, in the form of a final version of the revised OGA Strategy, for laying before Parliament. This final version is essentially identical to the version that accompanied the consultation in May 2020, with only a small number of minor drafting changes from that version.

Conclusions

The wait for the White Paper began some three years ago, under a different Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and a different Prime Minister. At around the same time, that Secretary of State had commissioned an independent review of the cost of energy which resulted in the economist Dieter Helm making wide-ranging and often quite radical recommendations about almost all the areas of energy policy now covered by the White Paper.

It is questionable whether anybody ever expected the White Paper to translate Helm’s vision into a programme of legislative and regulatory action, and it does not. However, it does show clear evidence of government thinking across the whole of energy and the sectors most affected by climate policy, and having serious plans, some of which could take a radical turn as they develop, to address the issues that its net zero agenda requires to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

There can be no doubt that, for obvious reasons, UK energy policy has developed more slowly than was desirable over the last four and a half years. However, there does appear now to be a fairly clear plan for how to make up the lost time. That does not guarantee that the execution will follow, but it is a good start, and we now have a much firmer and more detailed schedule, produced by the government itself, against which to measure its performance over the coming years. The progress that has already been made in some areas, such as parts of CCUS policy, shows what can be achieved at pace.

The next big domestic test of the government’s ambition, of course, will be its response – also due in 2021 – to the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendations on the Sixth Carbon Budget. Further events in the political timetable, notably the UK’s leadership of the G7 in 2021, and, of course, its hosting of COP26 in November 2021, can be expected to drive imperatives for major delivery milestones to be met at or before each event. 2021 is indeed set to be a busy year!

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UK hydrogen policy takes shape (1): publication of the UK Hydrogen Strategy


Sometimes, it is worth the wait. Hydrogen enthusiasts (which, these days, means almost everyone) have been asking for some time why the UK government had not yet produced a national hydrogen strategy. After all, a lot of other countries (and the EU) did so a year or more ago. With the publication on 17 August 2021 of the UK Hydrogen Strategy (the Strategy), we have the answer. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) took its time because it was engaging seriously with a complex task, and doing a thorough job.

Background

(We suggest that you skip this section, and possibly the next one, if you already know about hydrogen, for example by having read our earlier publications on the subject, linked at the end of this post.)

Most hydrogen produced today is used as a feedstock in industrial chemical processes, rather than as an energy vector. It is so-called “grey”, “brown” or “black” hydrogen, made from fossil fuels by processes like methane reformation, which emit CO2 and contribute to climate change. However, if made without such emissions, hydrogen could play a key part in the Energy Transition.

Adding carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) can greatly reduce, and eventually eliminate, these CO2 emissions. Hydrogen by methane reformation + CCUS is called “blue” hydrogen. Its sustainability depends on the success of the CCUS plant and eliminating methane emissions from the upstream and midstream natural gas industry (something that we need to do anyway).

Electrolysing water with electricity that has been produced without emitting CO2 results in zero carbon hydrogen. Hydrogen produced by electrolysing with renewable electricity is called “green” hydrogen. Inherently sustainable, its viability depends on rapid and massive scaling-up (and consequent cost reductions) of renewable electricity generation and electrolyser technology.

Zero carbon electricity can also break down methane into its constituent elements of carbon (in solid form, “carbon black”) and hydrogen (using pyrolysis, and known as “turquoise” hydrogen), without producing CO2 emissions. This is a potentially promising, but currently less developed technology.

These are not the only ways to make low carbon hydrogen (for example, nuclear power is as good as renewables as a source of carbon-free electricity), but they are the ones most widely considered.

Low carbon hydrogen is not a “silver bullet”. It is only one of the changes in energy production and use that are required to reach Net Zero greenhouse gas emissions. It is not the best (cheapest/most energy-efficient) option to decarbonise all aspects of energy use. However, there are some important things that it does, or could do, particularly well. For example, it can be used to:

  • store electricity for longer periods, more cheaply, and in greater bulk than any battery;
  • provide a fluid vector for transporting renewable energy by ship, between places that could not be linked by electricity transmission systems (e.g. Chile and Europe); and
  • provide energy for industrial heat and transport (e.g. aviation fuel) applications that it is hard to envisage being cost-effectively electrified in the short to medium term.

What is a hydrogen strategy for?

Among the key questions for any government developing a serious hydrogen policy are:

  • How do you overcome the barriers presented by the fact that low carbon hydrogen is currently significantly more costly to produce than grey hydrogen or any of the incumbent fuels/energy vectors for which low carbon hydrogen could be substituted – and, in so doing, to stimulate scaling-up of low carbon hydrogen technologies and progressive reductions in their cost?
  • Since switching to low carbon hydrogen requires not just investments in new production capacity, but also the adjustment and replacement of equipment on the demand side (from new steel manufacturing facilities to new bus-refuelling infrastructure or domestic boilers), what is the best way to overcome those switching cost barriers for businesses and households?
  • In the absence of a pre-existing/readily extendable network to feed into (contrast the position of the first renewable electricity generators, who could take this for granted), how is the demand risk of early hydrogen projects to be mitigated (e.g. in the case of a producer who signs a long-term contract and co-locates with a large industrial user of hydrogen, such as a refinery operator, which then ceases to trade or moves its business to another jurisdiction after a couple of years)?
  • For economies with a mature downstream natural gas industry that provides the primary energy source for much domestic, industrial and commercial heating, how far – and when – should hydrogen start to replace that natural gas (starting by being blended with – increasingly, biogenic – methane in the gas grid, and in time taking over some or all of the gas network completely)? 
  • How do you encourage the development of hydrogen applications whose real commercial potential (e.g. in aviation fuel) is probably at least 10 years away, preferably in such a way as to secure some competitive advantage in those future markets for businesses based in its territory?

Behind, or perhaps prior to, these headline questions, there is a range of more detailed issues about building the physical and economic infrastructure for a market in low carbon hydrogen as an energy commodity. These start with the question of what will count as “low carbon” in the first place, and encompass a variety of questions about the use, or re-purposing, of existing natural gas sector commercial and regulatory models and provisions for the hydrogen economy.

The Strategy’s general approach

The UK is taking a “colour-blind”, open-minded, urgent but cautious approach to developing hydrogen policy. Like some other recent UK energy policy documents, the Strategy is as much a list of future consultations to be held and decisions to be made as it is a statement of matters already decided. However, the timescales for future action look credible and it is clear from the Strategy itself and the other documents published alongside it that BEIS’s thinking is informed by robust analysis.

The guiding principles of the Strategy and the further policies to be developed from it are: long-term value for money (VfM) for taxpayers and consumers; growing the economy whilst cutting emissions; securing strategic advantages for the UK; minimising disruption and cost for consumers and households; keeping options open/adapting as the market develops; and taking a holistic approach.

In a world where talk of multi-GW low carbon hydrogen projects is becoming commonplace, the UK’s (already announced) targets of 1GW of low carbon hydrogen production by 2025, and 5GW by 2030 could seem pedestrian. However, this misses the point. The emphasis is not on numbers-based ambition for its own sake, but on building, as quickly as is sensible, a policy and regulatory environment that – from every perspective – will allow the UK hydrogen sector to flourish in the long term.

The Strategy is very focused on hydrogen’s contribution to meeting the UK’s Sixth Carbon Budget (“CB6”, covering the period 2033-2037). It notes that in most of the pathways modelled for CB6, hydrogen demand doubles in 2030-2035 and that hydrogen could supply up to a third of final energy consumption by 2050. However, taking account of uncertainty is a key feature of BEIS’s thinking: see, for example, the chart, showing ranges of possible demand (in TWh) by sector in 2030 and 2035.

The Strategy shows an awareness of the range of government and regulatory action needed to support a flourishing low carbon hydrogen sector, but it also sets that in a bigger picture which includes international activity and the role of the private sector. This is summarised in its figure 2.1, which, because of its size, we have reproduced at the end of this article.

Answers to the big questions?

The Strategy does not pretend to have the full answers to all (or, as yet, perhaps any) of the big strategic questions outlined above. However, in the context of those questions, what it says in relation to three areas of policy is particularly notable and encouraging.

  • BEIS has thought carefully about its proposed hydrogen business model (i.e. a regime of regulated financial assistance for low carbon hydrogen production), which is the subject of one of the consultations published alongside the Strategy. This aims to supplement the market price producers receive where this is lower than their costs of production. It would also address demand risk, by combining a “variable premium”, contract for difference-like price support mechanism and a “sliding scale” mechanism that would pay a higher level of price support on initial volumes, allowing the producer to recover fixed costs at relatively low offtake volumes. We will analyse the detail of these proposals elsewhere. The key point to note for now is that BEIS aims to digest and respond to responses to this consultation in Q1 2022, and to publish indicative heads of terms with that response, in preparation for allocating the first contracts under the business model in Q1 2023. This urgency is partly driven by the timetable of BEIS’s parallel CCUS programme, but the boost that the business model can provide to projects will be available to green, as well as blue, projects.
  • The blending of hydrogen in the gas grid is the subject of a number of innovation projects carried out by GB gas network operators. The ability to export hydrogen in this way offers producers a potentially ideal back-stop means of mitigating demand risk, and the substitution of low carbon hydrogen for some of the methane that would otherwise be consumed by end users connected to the grid could make significant contributions to decarbonisation. In this context, it is very encouraging that the Strategy promises an indicative VfM assessment on blending up to 20% hydrogen by Q3 2022, and a final decision on it in late 2023.
  • For some time now, it has been clear that there will be a strategic choice to be made on what should replace the fossil fuel methane that provides most space heating in the UK. Heat pumps powered by renewable electricity may be an ideal solution from some perspectives but, for a variety of reasons, a “mixed economy” of heat pumps and decarbonised gas-fired heating may be preferable, at least for some consumers. The Strategy sets a date (or at least a year) for taking a decision on the future of hydrogen in heat: 2026. This will be informed by the results of “neighbourhood” level trials in 2023, and “village” level trials in 2025.

Meanwhile, questions about meeting demand-side switching costs and developing the markets for future applications of low carbon hydrogen in the transport sector are partly answered by competitions for funding, details of which accompany the Strategy. These include:

  • £240 million for the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund (2022-2024/25);
  • up to £60 million under the Low Carbon Hydrogen Supply 2 competition;
  • financial support for fuel switching (via the Industrial Energy Transformation Fund, Industrial Fuel Switching 2 Competition and Red Diesel Replacement Competition);
  • up to £41.8 million on marine, aviation and other projects; and
  • £140 million split between buses (£120 million) and HGVs (£20 million), shared with battery technology.

At the same time, there is ample evidence of government pursuing the key background, commercial and regulatory infrastructure issues, such as:

  • reviewing the suitability of Gas Act framework and gas quality standards for facilitating a decarbonised gas future;
  • setting up a Hydrogen Regulators Forum (covering regulators with responsibility for environmental, safety, markets, competition and planning matters);
  • engagement with industry on optimising the benefits of early-adopting clusters; understanding the impacts of full or partial transition to hydrogen via the gas grid on industrial consumers and their needs; the possibility of a research and innovation facility to support hydrogen use in industry and power; and understanding economics and system impacts of hydrogen in the power sector.

Keeping up the pace

The Strategy and the other documents published with it (see below) are just the start. Below is a list of what the Strategy promises by way of further policy development in the coming months.

  • Before the end of 2021, the Strategy promises:
    • “We will set out our aspirations to continue to lead the world on carbon pricing” (in the run-up to COP26). Needless to say, this could be hugely important. A sufficiently rigorous and broad-based approach to carbon pricing has the potential to turbo-charge the development of a hydrogen economy. Might the UK extend its Emissions Trading System to sectors such as heat and transport, as the EU is proposing to do with the EU Emissions Trading System? Might it seek to incentivise energy-intensive industries not only in the UK but beyond to switch to the use of low carbon hydrogen and other cleaner forms of energy by adopting a border carbon adjustment – again, as the EU is proposing to do?
    • A consultation on enabling/requiring new gas boilers to be easily convertible to hydrogen by 2026: for most consumers, this could be their point of entry into the hydrogen economy. Getting both the technical details and the messaging right is very important.
    • call for evidence on hydrogen-ready industrial equipment: a precursor, perhaps, to the business-sector equivalent of the above.
    • A call for evidence on the future of the gas system: clearly an important building block towards some of the key decisions for later in the decade highlighted above.
  • In or by “early 2022”, the Strategy tells us to look out for:
    • further detail on production strategy…including less developed methods;UK standard for low carbon hydrogen – design elements to be finalised;
    • status update on hydrogen storage: review of systemic regulatory/funding requirements;
    • Hydrogen Sector Development Action Plan;
    • initial conclusions and proposals on identifying, prioritising and addressing regulatory barriers;
    • initial conclusions and proposals on developing appropriate market frameworks.
  • On a slightly more leisurely timescale (within a year), we are to expect a call for evidence on phasing out carbon intensive hydrogen and its replacement with the low carbon variety.
  • Finally, the Strategy tells us that a call for evidence on “energy consumer funding, affordability and fairness” (an issue that clearly goes beyond hydrogen, but is very important to the question of how support for low carbon hydrogen is to be funded) is “expected to be published soon”.

For ease of reference/further reading

As already noted, the Strategy was not the only hydrogen policy document released by BEIS on 17 August 2021. For ease of reference, we produce links to the Strategy and all the other documents below. We will be commenting further on these in due course, as well as on the other policy documents that the Strategy promises will be forthcoming, as they emerge. If you have any questions about UK hydrogen policy in the meantime, please get in touch!

UK government launches plan for a world-leading hydrogen economy – press release.

UK hydrogen strategy: sets out the approach to developing a thriving low carbon hydrogen sector in the UK to meet our ambition for 5GW of low carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030.

Hydrogen analytical annex: supports the policy thinking in the Strategy and other documents below.

Hydrogen production costs 2021: presents levelised cost estimates for hydrogen production technologies, detailing methodology, data and assumptions.

Consultation on a business model for low carbon hydrogen: seeks views on the design for a low carbon hydrogen business model (in other words, a subsidy/revenue stabilisation mechanism).

Designing the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund: seeks views to inform the design of the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund (NZHF), to support at-scale deployment of low carbon hydrogen production in the 2020s.

Consultation on a UK low carbon hydrogen standard: seeks views on design options for a UK standard that defines “low carbon” hydrogen, to underpin our support for hydrogen production.

Options for a UK low carbon hydrogen standard: report: sets out options for a standard that could define what is meant by “low carbon” hydrogen; has informed the consultation above.

Hydrogen for heat: facilitating a grid conversion hydrogen heating trial: seeks views on possible legislative changes to enable the delivery of a hydrogen grid conversion trial.

There are also some relevant funding competitions in the Net Zero Innovation Portfolio:

  • Low Carbon Hydrogen (Stream 2): this aims to support innovation in the supply of hydrogen, reducing the costs of supplying hydrogen, bringing new solutions to the market and ensuring that the UK continues to develop world-leading hydrogen technologies for a future hydrogen economy;
  • Industrial Fuel Switching competition: this will support innovation in the development of pre-commercial fuel switch and fuel switch enabling technology for the industrial sector, to help industry switch from high to lower carbon fuels: expected to launch in October 2021;
  • Red Diesel replacement competition: a £40 million competition to support the development and demonstration of low carbon fuel and system alternatives to red diesel for the construction, and mining and quarrying sectors from April 2022.

Strategy Figure 2.1

The pictures below are taken from Figure 2.1 of the Strategy. It gives a good summary of BEIS’s overall vision of the roles that government and others will play in developing a UK hydrogen economy.

Links to some earlier Dentons publications on low carbon hydrogen

The prospect for hydrogen (a general survey)

Making early hydrogen projects investable (jointly written with Frontier Economics, focusing on regulated financial assistance for blue hydrogen projects in the UK context)

Scaling up green hydrogen in Europe (jointly written with ILF and Operis, including linked webinar)

The Oil and Gas Authority’s Net Zero Goals; Hydrogen

Blending hydrogen in the GB gas grid (two articles, here and here)

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UK hydrogen policy takes shape (2): defining “low carbon hydrogen”


We have all become used to talking about the various “colours” of “low carbon hydrogen”. When we talk about “blue” or “green” hydrogen, we know we are referring to something whose production is meant to result in fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than producing standard “grey” hydrogen by reforming methane and venting the waste CO2. However, if, like the UK government, you are going to spend large amounts of public money subsidising the production of “low carbon hydrogen”, with a view to hitting net zero targets, you need to be a good deal clearer about exactly what you are getting.

In this post, we look at two documents: Consultation on a UK low carbon hydrogen standard (Consultation), and an accompanying consultants’ report on Options for a UK low carbon hydrogen standard (Options Report). They were published by the UK’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) on 17 August 2021. For background, a full list of the BEIS hydrogen policy documents published on that date and a discussion on the UK’s overarching Strategy, click here.

This is not the first time the UK government has consulted on a low carbon hydrogen standard. It first did so (although only in relation to green hydrogen) in 2015. Since then, as the Options Report outlines, other hydrogen standards have started to occupy the field, including CertifHY, TÜV SÜD, and emerging Chinese and Australian schemes. The EU’s second Renewable Energy Directive’s provisions on “renewable fuels of non-biological origin” (which include those containing green hydrogen), and their implementation, have also forced consideration of a number of key issues. However, for the moment, as the Consultation points out, there is “no single understanding or formal definition of what is actually meant by ‘low carbon’ hydrogen in the UK”, and this gaps needs filling.

Spoiler alert

If you have ever thought about what a low carbon hydrogen standard might look like, you will have got as far as thinking in terms of a limit based on GHG emissions. You might have thought that such a limit could either be set very low – thus potentially including only “green” hydrogen produced by electrolysis using 100% renewable electricity, or somewhat higher – thus also including “blue” hydrogen produced by methane reformation with efficient CO2 capture and storage. But essentially, you were probably thinking in terms of a single, headline threshold figure.

The Consultation does not suggest what the headline GHG emissions limit of a future UK low carbon hydrogen standard should be. However, it does include a graph – Figure 2, reproduced below – which usefully indicates how the consultants who produced the Options Report think that different production technologies compare in terms of emissions intensity. The blue bars in the chart are estimates of the range (from high to low) of GHG emissions associated with different hydrogen production techniques at different points in the next 30 years (with the blue diamonds representing the central estimate of emissions for each technology). The red line indicates “the potential impacts of an example threshold of around 15-20 gCO2e/MJLHV of produced hydrogen”. In other words, if a figure in that range were chosen as the standard, those technologies that are above the line would likely not meet the standard, and therefore not qualify for public financial support, while those technologies that are below the line would meet the standard and qualify for support.

Policy context

The Consultation makes it clear that BEIS wants the standard to encourage, not inhibit, new hydrogen production. Compliance with the standard would be one of the determinants of eligibility for financial support via the UK’s hydrogen “business model” or Net Zero Hydrogen Fund. The Consultation stresses that it is important to ensure that “any investment made today is directed towards production technologies that are consistent with the UK’s net-zero commitments and carbon budgets”.

The Consultation makes it clear that BEIS is engaged with other bodies that have set or are formulating similar standards in other countries and internationally. It is also alive to the possibility of both imports and exports of hydrogen to and from the UK. However, its focus is primarily on domestic production and consumption of low carbon hydrogen.

The aim is to establish a GHG emissions standard for low carbon hydrogen that meets the eight criteria of being inclusive (e.g. technology neutral); accessible (cost-effective, simple and user-friendly); transparent; compatible (working with other UK energy sector schemes and other countries’ standards); ambitious; accurate; robust (with strong penalties for fraud etc.); and predictable.

Multiple variables

The Consultation outlines the many points that need to be decided when establishing a standard, in addition to the headline emissions figure. These include:

  • Matters of scope: Should the standard cover only hydrogen produced and used in the UK? Should it reflect emissions only up to the “point of production” (BEIS’s preference) or some downstream emissions too? Should “production” emissions include those that are “embodied” in equipment or associated with the production of natural gas?
  • Accounting for electricity emissions: BEIS seems wary of adopting a standard that would limit support only to projects with off-grid renewable generation dedicated entirely to hydrogen production. However, should the standard go as far as allowing production by any grid-sourced electricity (see the graph above)? If it is limited to production from renewable power only, should that be on the basis of claims based on production from grid-connected renewables physically linked to the electrolyser, or also on trading and the cancellation of guarantees of origin? Should other conditions be imposed (e.g. temporal or geographic constraints designed to ensure the electrolysers support rather than undermine grid stability)? Perhaps most important is the vexed question of “additionality”: should the standard cover only hydrogen produced from new renewable electricity generating capacity built for that purpose, rather than encouraging its production from other existing or future renewable generating capacity, thereby delaying decarbonisation of the grid – and, if so, how?
  • Other accounting matters: Should there be physical traceability of emissions, through a mass balance system, or should a “book and claim” (certificate trading) system be followed? Should carbon captured and used – rather than stored – in blue hydrogen production count as GHG emissions avoided for this purpose, and if so under what conditions? How do you prove that captured CO2 will not return to the atmosphere over an agreed minimum period of time in this context? How do you account for waste fossil feedstocks or mixed inputs (e.g. if a plant uses a mixture of “clean” and “dirty” electricity sources to power its electrolyser, do you average their emissions over its whole output, or divide its output into green and grey batches)?
  • Core measurement issues: Do you measure how many kgCO2e are emitted per kg of hydrogen produced, or how many kgCO2e are emitted per MJ Lower Heating Value or per kWh Higher Heating Value? BEIS prefers the latter. How do you deal with negative emissions (see the chart above) or measure any non-GHG impacts that may be taken into account (e.g. water consumption or air quality)? Finally, should the GHG threshold itself be defined in absolute terms or in relative terms (e.g. by reference to a fossil fuel comparator)?
  • One size fits all? Whilst BEIS is clear that it wants a standard that applies across technologies, it leaves open the possibility of there being more than one threshold. There could be more less demanding thresholds, as in some existing schemes. As the market evolves, the Consultation also suggests that thresholds may tighten over time, but without retrospectively depriving projects that met an earlier applicable threshold for support.
  • Administrative details: Who is going to run the standard? Will it work on “default” or “actual” emissions data? Who will report (and verify/audit) each participant’s emissions?

All told, respondents are asked no fewer than 42 questions (many of which have more than one part). In many cases, the Consultation does not indicate BEIS’s preferred position, although the Options Report (chapter 6) does include traffic-light coded tables that evaluate each set of options against the eight criteria mentioned above, and the consultants make recommendations based on these.

What next?

BEIS expects “to finalise design elements of a UK low carbon hydrogen standard by early 2022”. In early 2023, it aims to be signing the first contracts under the hydrogen business model, and those involved will need a clear understanding of the standards they will be committing to by then, if not sooner. There is clearly a lot of detailed work to do in a relatively short space of time.

As the Consultation and Options Report show, there are a number of trade-offs to be made in reaching a view on the many choices inherent in specifying a low carbon hydrogen standard. Strategically, perhaps the dominant one is between a “higher” standard/higher initial subsidy costs/lower initial production volumes and a “lower” standard/lower subsidy costs/higher initial production. Arguably, though, the true test of a low carbon hydrogen standard will be how it is received in the market. For example, if today you set up “gold” and “silver” standards, and subsidise projects that meet either, what happens if, when the subsidy contract ends in 2035, the market for low carbon hydrogen that you have succeeded in stimulating has no interest in “silver”-compliant hydrogen?

It is not obvious that there are “right answers” to many of the questions in the consultation, in the overall context of developing a UK hydrogen sector. As usual, the policy will only be as good as the inputs to it. If you have views on the questions raised, you have until 25 October 2021 to respond. We would be happy to help you put your case to BEIS.

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UK hydrogen policy takes shape (3): financial support (part 1)


As a share of UK electricity generation, renewables increased tenfold between 2004 and 2019. The various forms of public financial support provided to the sector played a major part in this. Government policy is now targeting an even more spectacular increase in the production of low carbon hydrogen in the UK over the next 10 years. Once again, subsidies will be crucial.

In this post, and the next one, we discuss the UK government’s recently published plans for financial support to the low carbon hydrogen sector. These are set out in Consultation on a business model for low carbon hydrogen (BM Consultation) and Designing the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund Consultation (NZHF Consultation). Both documents were published by the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) on 17 August 2021. For general background, a full list of the other hydrogen policy documents published on the same date and a discussion on BEIS’s overarching Strategy, click here. For a post on the related consultation on standards, click here.

Background

The hydrogen business model and NZHF aim to help low carbon hydrogen production projects overcome a number of barriers: high production costs (relative to alternative, high-carbon (“counterfactual”) fuels); technological and commercial risk; uncertain demand for their product; lack of an established market structure (in sharp contrast to renewable electricity); lack of distribution and storage infrastructure; and policy and regulatory uncertainty (at least, prior to 17 August 2021).

The hydrogen business model would do this by giving projects revenue support during their operational phase. The NZHF would provide capital support, likely in the form of grants payable on the completion of certain milestones. These two schemes are complemented by BEIS’s evolving industrial carbon capture business model, which may support investment in carbon capture retrofitting of existing “grey” (rather than new “blue” or “green”) hydrogen capacity.

BEIS takes the view that both forms of support (revenue and capital) are needed. It also considers that other relevant interventions that could boost demand for low carbon hydrogen (such as broader and sharper carbon pricing) would not be adequate on their own to secure the future of the low carbon hydrogen sector. It sees the central functions of the business model as addressing:

  • market price risk (the risk that the price a producer can get for its hydrogen in the market does not cover its production costs); and
  • volume risk (the risk that the producer cannot sell enough hydrogen to cover its costs: for example, because its customers go out of business, move or switch supplier).

In designing the business model and NZHF, BEIS is mindful that the hydrogen value chain is both nascent and complex; that the value of hydrogen varies considerably between different potential end user groups; and that methane reformation is less flexible than electrolytic production.

In the remainder of this post, we look at BEIS’s overall view of the proposed hydrogen business model and at how it proposes to address market price risk. In the next post, we will look at how the business model would address volume risk, and other aspects of the proposals, including how support under the business model would be allocated to individual projects.

What kind of scheme should the hydrogen business model be?

BEIS says that it would prefer the hydrogen business model to be funded and delivered on a UK-wide basis. It would be applicable to all low carbon hydrogen production technologies that meet the requisite standard in terms of GHG emissions (which is not the same thing as saying that any project using any technology would be eligible for support). It should assist uptake of low carbon hydrogen across a range of potential energy applications.

BEIS appears to see the business model as essentially a domestic scheme: “exports of hydrogen could be permitted for projects benefiting from business model support, although the specific volumes exported would not be eligible for support payments”. Even in the domestic context, it is also designed to provide support only for production, and not for financing significant distribution or storage infrastructure – although “small-scale hydrogen pipelines and non-pipeline distribution and small-scale storage infrastructure could potentially be factored in as part of projects’ overall costs”.

In principle, if you are seeking to close the price gap between low carbon hydrogen and counterfactual fuels, you could do it by subsidising either producers or end users. BEIS prefers the former as being simpler and less vulnerable to complications on the demand side. It also wants to deliver support through contracts, rather than a “policy-based approach” or economic regulation.

UK public support for renewable electricity generating projects has been through a number of iterations, notably green certificates (ROCs), feed-in tariffs and contracts for difference (CfDs). BEIS is determined that the hydrogen business model should be one that stands the test of time. The BM Consultation states that its design should conform to 10 core principles: promoting market development; promoting market competition; being investable; providing value for money (VfM); reducing support over time; being suitable for future pipeline; being compatible with other hydrogen policies; being technology agnostic; being size agnostic; and avoiding unnecessary complexity.

Mitigating price risk in the hydrogen business model

Many European countries began subsidising renewable electricity generation by paying a guaranteed price per unit of electricity generated. This has the merit of simplicity, and works easily enough if there is already a physically connected, liquid market for the commodity in question (electricity). In a market for low carbon hydrogen which (if it exists) has neither of these characteristics, it is less attractive.

BEIS accordingly rejects the “fixed price” approach. It also rejects the idea of a “fixed premium (over market price)” approach on the grounds of risk of producer overcompensation/lack of VfM. Instead, it proposes a variable premium as the best way of mitigating producers’ price risk.

In the renewable electricity world, this has been relatively straightforward to implement – in the UK, as the CfD that supports many GW of generating capacity. For each MW of output, the generator is paid (or makes a payment) based on the difference between a reference price (RP) derived from wholesale market indices and a strike price (SP) set by competitive auction. If SP-RP is positive, the generator is paid by, and if it is negative, it must make a payment to, the CfD counterparty, the Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC). The operation of the CfD regime is summarised in the diagram below, taken from LCCC guidance and showing hypothetical changes in the wholesale price of electricity (and therefore the RP) across the 48 half-hourly settlement periods in 24-hour period.

Translating the variable premium approach to the hydrogen context, setting an SP is not difficult in principle. As in the electricity context, it represents the overall value that a producer needs to achieve per unit to cover its fixed and variable costs, financing costs and equity return. The only question is whether you arrive at that figure by BEIS modelling, bilateral negotiations or a competitive process.

The bigger challenge is to decide what the RP should be, since there is not yet a market wholesale price for low carbon hydrogen. Rather, as the BM Consultation points out, the way that BEIS sets the RP will influence price formation in this new market. It goes on to assess seven RP options. It does this in terms of their suitability as proxies for the value of low carbon hydrogen to end users; their ability to promote market development; their likely VfM from BEIS’s perspective; and evolution over time. Crucially, it assesses the options without making assumptions about the level of any other relevant government intervention, such as carbon pricing.

The options rejected (although BEIS finds that even each of these has some advantages) are:

  • input energy price: no necessary positive correlation with hydrogen value; nothing to stop overcompensation where producers sell at a high price; no guarantee of reducing subsidy trajectory; may indirectly subsidise the producer’s other operations (by transfer pricing);
  • natural gas price: may be an excessive subsidy for sales to users of more expensive fuel; those who pay no carbon price are less incentivised; subsidy may not reduce over time;
  • counterfactual fuel prices: take the RP that fits each customer, and each pays the same price as before switching, with a carbon cost saving if they are subject to a carbon price (producers may be incentivised to sell into markets that can absorb highest volumes with least effort, and the incentive to switch is limited to carbon cost savings);
  • carbon price: may not perfectly reflect hydrogen market value – or be strongly correlated with production costs, especially for green hydrogen – and the correlation will weaken over time; suitability may depend on contract length; inherently more suited to demand side subsidy;
  • natural gas price + carbon price: removes price incentive on industrial users to switch, since their fuel cost would be the same and they still have the capex costs of switching.

BEIS’s favoured RP options are:

  • a market benchmark: (i.e. the low carbon hydrogen equivalent of the indices used in renewable electricity CfDs) when this can be robustly and reliably calculated – as such it is the preferred option for future contracts on NOAK projects, but cannot be applied yet;
  • the price at which the producer sells the unit in question, subject to a floor price set at the natural gas price: this will do until a benchmark is available. The starting point for calculating RP in each case would be the actual sale price, but there would be no additional subsidy for selling a unit at a price below the natural gas price if the achieved sales price is lower than the natural gas price. It is not entirely clear whether the “natural gas price” would be the wholesale price or aim to represent what each end user would pay for gas. In practice, it seems likely that producers may set their prices at, or at least by reference to, a gas price. This, the proposed model for the near term, is illustrated from the BM Consultation below.

It is further proposed that there should be “additional contractual measures, such as a gainshare mechanism or a periodic payment linked to achieving or exceeding a defined pricing threshold or benchmark”. Further work on this is to be “discussed with stakeholders”.

The BM Consultation raises the question of how the SP should be indexed to take account of changes in producers’ costs over time, but it does not reach a conclusion on a particular index, having found something to be said both for and against each of: a general price inflation index; increases in actual energy costs; a natural gas benchmark; and an electricity price benchmark.

Already, we have something that is materially more complex than the renewable support CfD structure, even at an administrative level (given the need to record each transaction and its price, rather than simply metering the export from a generating station). However, as we explain in the next post, there are further complexities to the hydrogen business model to deal with volume risk.

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